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ABSTRACT
With the remarkable development of GMOs, GMO trade has also increased. The
different attitudes on GMOs among the countries all over the world, specifically the US, EU,
and South Korea, have the potential to create international trade conflicts. In order to mediate
the conflicts, reasonable labeling and liability systems need to be established to prevent
potential GMO risks. The Biosafety Protocol regarding the transboundary movement of
GMOs exists to resolve such tensions, but it fails to sufficiently solve the problems and
provide clear regulations concerning GMO labeling and liability systems.
A successful GMO labeling and liability system should emphasize the precautionary
principle and use a cooperative approach that considers all views on GMOs. After reviewing
current international and domestic standards, particularly the ones in South Korea, the GMO
labeling system should be mandatory, supporting the “consumer’s right to know.”
Additionally, the new GMO liability system should reflect a civil liability system, where
standards protect the party injured by GMOs in the direction of compensating the damage
fully and efficiently by using the precautionary principle.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are organisms where the genetic materials
have been altered and newly produced in a way that does not occur naturally. There are many
different terminologies for GMOs all over the world, such as Living Modified Organisms
(LMOs), Genetically Engineered Organisms, and Biotechnology Products. As seen in the
terminology used, each country regards them differently.1 For clarification, this paper will
use the term GMOs, except in the case where the law has an official title, such as the LMO
Act of South Korea.2 The term GMO was chosen because it is regarded as the most universal
and comprehensive term.
Before the discussion on GMO regulation, a brief explanation on the history and
present conditions about GMO development and trade will be useful for better understanding.
GMOs fall under the field of biotechnology, which deals with technological applications to
make or modify products for specific use. The growth of biotechnology has developed the
production of GMOs. GMOs initially started in the US, and the first approval of a product
was the delayed ripening tomato by the Calgene Company in 1994.3 Globally, the cultivation

1

The term LMO focuses on the meaning of “living” organisms that can self-reproduce and the
representative international norm used to regard GMOs (e.g., the “Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity” [hereinafter the Biosafety Protocol]) uses the term of LMOs. The US
prefers to use the term Genetically Engineered Organisms or Biotechnology Products, and the EU prefers to use
the term GMOs.
2

In South Korea, there is the “Act on Transboundary Movements of Living Modified Organisms” as
a domestic implementation legislation of the Biosafety Protocol. It is called the LMO Act. The Korea Biosafety
Clearing House provides the English draft version of the LMO Act. See Laws and Regulations, KOREA
BIOSAFETY CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.biosafety.or.kr/english/laws/The%20Act%20on%20Transboundary%20Movements%20of%20Living%20Modified%20Organisms.pdf
3

CLIVE JAMES & ANATOLE F. KRATTIGER, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS (ISAAA) BRIEF NO. 1, GLOBAL REVIEW OF THE FIELD TESTING AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TRANSGENIC PLANTS, 1986 TO 1995: THE FIRST DECADE OF CROP BIOTECHNOLOGY 23 (1996), available at
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/01/download/isaaa-brief-01-1996.pdf
1

area of GMOs was 1.7 million hectares4 in 1996 and it increased to 170 million hectares in
2012. The fact that it took just 16 years to reach a 100-fold increase shows that Genetically
Modified crops (GM crops) has been the fastest adopted biotechnology in recent history.5
The US continues to be the leading country for using GM crops with 69.5 million hectares
and 90 percent of its crops being GM products, including corn, soybeans, cottons, sugar beets
and canola.6
With the development of GMOs, GMO trade has also increased. The US is the most
representative country to export GMOs. Brazil, Argentina and Canada are other major GMO
exporting countries. The EU and South Korea are countries that import GMOs. The EU has a
high degree of self-sufficiency for food, but the EU is one of the importing countries in a
trade relationship with the US. In contrast, South Korea is importing a considerable amount
of GMOs from other countries. In 2012, South Korea imported 7.84 million tons of GMOs
from the US, which is equivalent to 2.67 billion dollars.7 The countries from which South
Korea imports GMOs vary from the US to Brazil, to Argentina, and many more. However,
the US is still the top country to export GMOs to South Korea.8 Both developed countries
and developing countries are participating in GMO development and GMO trade, and it is

4

The hectare is a unit area used for measuring land. 1 hectare is defined as 10,000 square meters or
about 2.471 acres.
5

CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS (ISAAA) BRIEF
NO. 44, GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2012 1-4 (2012), available at
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/44/download/isaaa-brief-44-2012.pdf
6

See Id.

7

JeoungSook Cho, GMOs going through at a glance with major statistics data of 2012, 14-1
BAIOSEIPEUTI JEONEOL [BIOSAFETY JOURNAL] 21 (2013). Biosafety Journal is one of the two main publications
issued by the Korean Biosafety Clearing House (“KBCH”). The Biosafety Journal has been issued quarterly
since 2000. It includes a variety of articles by scholars and government officers, focusing on the issues related to
R&D and the safety of GMOs. On the other hand, the Biosafety White Paper has been issued yearly since 2003.
It mainly contains the ministries’ circumstances in implementing the LMO Act. See Publications, KOREAN
BIOSAFETY CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.biosafety.or.kr/english/index.asp
8

See Id.
2

predicted that GMO development and trade will continue to grow. This continued
development and trade of GMOs will ultimately lead to many conflicts and disputes between
countries based on each country’s own interests. Therefore, reasonable and persuasive GMO
regulation is needed on the international level.
The Biosafety Protocol was one agreement regarding GMOs on an international level,
focusing on the transboundary movement of GMOs. However, the Biosafety Protocol
conflicts with the existing international trade treaty: the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The WTO rules aim to guarantee “free trade” between countries. However, the Biosafety
Protocol emphasizes the protection of the environment from the risks of GMOs under the
precautionary principle. Besides the conflicts with the WTO rules, the Biosafety Protocol
itself is problematic in that it is not sufficient and needs clarification of two important parts of
GMO regulation – GMO labeling and liability.
Another existing problem with GMO regulation lies in the different domestic
attitudes within the current domestic laws. These laws are based on preventative and
favorable policies for GMOs, where only one side of GMOs is emphasized. Proponents of
GMOs highlight the benefits of GMO and argue that GMOs could be an alternative for the
growing world population and that it could be helpful for the human health and the
environment. On the other hand, opponents of GMOs stress the risk of GMOs and say that
there exists a threat of disrupting the ecosystem. This threat could potentially harm the
environment and human health, possibly creating new viruses or allergenic problems.
However, there is no accurate and obvious scientific evidence to show the risk or safety of
GMOs. This principle is called “scientific uncertainty.”9 Therefore, this scientific uncertainty

9

Among scientists, there exists a debate on the experimental result and methodology of GMO risks.
Also, environmentalists change their opinion often about GMO risks. This situation increases confusion on the
3

creates dissonance between the domestic GMO regulations in nations around the world,
particularly the US, the EU and South Korea.
This thesis is comprised of five sections. Section II looks into the philosophical
perspectives regarding GMOs, which will be the basis of GMO regulations, and explores how
international laws and domestic laws in the US, the EU, and South Korea reflect these
perspectives.
Section III seeks to find an effective GMO labeling system to protect the consumers’
right to know and analyzes the consistency of the future ideal labeling system with the
existing WTO rules. Currently, the GMO labeling system in the EU enforces the strongest
mandatory labeling system with the traceability system, and the US enforces a voluntary one.
For setting up reasonable international standards and harmonizing different attitudes among
the US, the EU, and South Korea, South Korea’s attitudes has the possibility of being a model
for concession. However, South Korea’s regulation is not fully recommendable due to its
ineffective GMO labeling systems, resulting from many exception clauses. South Korea
enforces a mandatory liability system, but also establishes certain conditions for mandatory
labeling. Due to these exception clauses, considering the presence of GM materials in final
products and the priority of GM crops used in GM foods, it is rare to actually find GMO
labeling in South Korea.10 If South Korea’s labeling system is well revised to close the
loopholes, it could be a potential model in creating a GMO labeling system between proGMO and anti-GMO countries.
Many loopholes also exist in the GMO liability and redress system, listed in Section

GMOs. See, e.g., Aaron Perlut, Mark Lycas: From GMO Hater to Supporter, FORBES, July 9, 2013, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aaronperlut/2013/07/09/mark-lynas-from-gmo-hater-to-supporter/
10

See SungYong Park & SukChul Kim, A Study on the Trade Policy and Issues of GMO labeling, 371 MUYEOKHAKHOEJI [Trade Law Journal] 108 (2012).
4

IV. In order to fix the current Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol11, it is important
to find the loopholes and set up an international agreement for an effective and sufficient
relief of damages caused by the transboundary movement of GMOs. This GMO liability
regime must also reflect GMO characteristics under the Biosafety Protocol.12 With the effort
on international level, all three countries (the US, the EU, and South Korea) are needed to
establish a new and reasonable domestic liability regime.
In order to achieve an international regulation system, it is imperative that a
cooperative approach by all participating countries is taken in solving and negotiating the
GMO regulation problems. This will ensure to mitigate the current gaps between the
countries and successfully create an international standard for GMO regulation. Therefore,
this paper will use a legal analysis on current international and domestic laws and situations,
in combination with major principles within the field, to come up with a resolution.

II. Philosophies and laws about GMO regulations

Many countries vary on their attitudes about GMOs. As the trade of GMOs is
increasing, this difference causes international conflict. The difficulty of solving GMO
problems is due to the different interpretations and participation of international norms, and
the different domestic laws. Each country’s conflicting laws and policies are based on the

11

The official name of this supplementary protocol is “Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary
Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety” [hereinafter the Liability and Redress
Supplementary Protocol].
12

KAREEN L. HOLTBY, WILLIAM A. KERR & JILL E. HOBBS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY AND BARRIERS TO TRADE: MARKET ACCESS AND BIODIVERSITY IN THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL 142
(2007).
5

country’s own philosophy about GMOs.13 Therefore, to see exactly where each country
stands, it is necessary to take a look at the GMO regulation philosophies of each nation
before looking at the varying domestic laws.

A. Background for GMO regulation

The US, EU, and South Korea all have different attitudes about GMOs when looking
at both legal and administrative perspectives. A big gap between the two main developed
countries, the US and EU, is especially evident. This different approach depends on how the
countries prioritize biotechnological development values and protecting human and
environmental safety. The US emphasizes the positive aspects of developing biotechnology
and the international trade rulings, which focuses on free trade (the concerns about the export
and transport of goods between different countries).14 On the other hand, the EU emphasizes
the risk of GMO development and the need for regulations according to the international
environmental law, focusing on health and environmental protection.15
This kind of tension on legal interests is found in the fields of international law. The
international trade laws and the international environmental laws have distinct legislative
intent, which inevitably leads to conflicts between the international norms and trickles down

13

GMO related issues could be analyzed from a variety of perspectives, such as science, risk, politics,
society, and culture. See David Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-white & Brian
Wynne, Adjudicating the GM food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L.
81, 93-99 (2005).
14

See SIMONETTA ZARRILLI, POL’Y ISSUES IN INT’L TRADE AND COMMODITIES STUD. SERIES NO. 29,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GMOS AND GM PRODUCTS: NATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 7
(2005).
15

See Id.
6

to domestic laws and policies.16 For example, if the GMO import country emphasizes health
and environmental laws, then the country is likely to assert many exceptions to international
trade laws as well. Therefore, the GMO export country will feel as if the trade laws have been
violated, ultimately leading to conflict between the two countries with different ideals.
Each country also has its own interests and intents about GMOs regarding the
economy and politics. The US is the largest GMO exporting country in the world when
discussing economic power.17 Recently, a study has shown that political power has an effect
on the GMO regulations of countries between developed and developing countries.18 The
developing countries’ GMO policy could be influenced by other developed countries, such as
the US and EU. Finally, the cultural difference could lead to diverse approaches on GMOs.19
For example, Europeans have food practices that prefer natural foods, stressing the quality of
foods, while the US tends to practice food technologies, applying new technologies to
develop food in order to increase quantity.20 However, by understanding each country’
opinions on GMOs, this will allow for an agreeable solution in regulating GMOs.

16

See Id. at 24.

17

Large companies in the US, such as Monsanto, Nestle, General Mills, and PepsiCo, experience cost
benefits by using the added ingredients of corn, rice, canola oil and soybeans, which were the first FDAapproved GMOs. See Rachel Hennessey, GMO Food Debate In the National Spotlight, FORBES, Nov. 3, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelhennessey/2012/11/03/gmo-food-debate-in-the-national-spotlight/
18

See Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy For GMO Accountability,
21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 60 (2008) (explaining a right of self-determination as a basis of this theory
and states that the US pro-GMO policy has a risk of violating other countries’ right of self-determination).
19

See Cara V. Coburn, Out of the Perti Dish and Back to the People: A Cultural Approach to GMO
Policy, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 283, 294 (2005).
20
Id.; Tassos Haniotis, The Economics of Agricultural Biotechnology: Differences and Similarities in
the US and the EU, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE –ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 173
(Gerald C. Nelson ed., 2001).
7

B. General philosophies for GMO regulation

Looking broadly at the theories approaching GMOs, there are two different approaches
on GMO regulations. One is the approach that concerns the possible risk of GMOs and the
other is concerned with favoring GMOs. This section will examine some of the principles
under these different perspectives in order to learn where each country’s GMO regulation is
based on and to find a reasonable approach. It will also examine the emphasis on the
coexistence of GMOs and non-GMOs, which first began in the EU to find an agreeable
approach for all countries.

1. Preventative measures for GMO regulation

a. Use of risk assessment

The policies and regulations on GMOs could vary according to how each country
evaluates the risk of GMOs. Each country takes an action based on measured effects by risk
assessment. The EU Directive provides an environmental risk assessment and authorization
procedure of GMOs.21 The risk assessment is obligated to consider the “risks to human
health and the environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, where the
deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs may pose” under the Directive.22
The domestic legislation of South Korea also uses the risk assessment of GMOs under the
LMO Act, a comprehensive and general law about GMOs. Meanwhile, the US utilizes the risk

21

See Ruth MacKenzie & Silvia Francescon, The Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods in the
European Union: An Overview, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 530, 530 (2000).
22
See Magaret Rosso Grossman, The Coexistence of GM and Other Crops in the European Union,
16-SPG KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 324, 336 (2007).
8

assessment for GMOs by using existing laws that deal with potentially hazardous products.23
Presently, the risk assessment is used in regards to regulating GMOs. The Biosafety
Protocol, the current representative international norm about GMOs, has two articles of risk
assessment and risk management in Article 15 and 16. Furthermore, the Annex III of the
Biosafety Protocol provides the specific contents of risk assessment.24 In addition, the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS Agreement), one of the existing international
trade laws under the WTO, provides that the measures to protect human or environment
should be based on a risk assessment in the Article 5.1.25 The risk assessment is the first and
essential part of GMO regulation and is provided in both international and domestic norms.
However, each country’s standards and results of the GMO risk assessment are shown
differently.
b. Precautionary principle

The precautionary principle is relevant to risk assessment in that the proved scientific
data and evaluation of them is necessary when the regulation on GMOs was taken under the
precautionary principle.26 In the spectrum of the amount of information with time, the

23

The assessment of GMOs within the US was first carried out by the FDA in 1992. The result of the
assessment in the US stated that new GMO products were considered to be genetically recognized as safe
(“GRAS”). See Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk Assessment: Importers, Exporters and the
Limits of Science, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 246 (2010).
24

See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON
BIOSAFETY 105 (2003).
25

With regard to the GMO risk assessment, there is an opinion that emphasizes public participation
under the SPS Agreement. See Winickoff et al., supra note 13, at 99-102 (stating that public input could play an
important role in GMO risk assessment under the scientific uncertainty regarding GMOs).
26

See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 13, 26 (2002) (explaining that the European Commission repeatedly emphasized the need for risk
assessment based on available information and states “before the precautionary principle is invoked, the
scientific data relevant to the risks must first be evaluated.”). See also, Anne Ingeborg Myhr, The Role of
Precautionary Motivated Science in Addressing Scientific Uncertainties Related to GMOs, in BIOSAFETY FIRST HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED
9

precautionary principle plays an important role to permit regulations, despite the lack of
accumulated and completely scientific information.27
It is necessary to review the precautionary principle when discussing GMOs. The
GMO labeling system and GMO liability system are understood as policies based on the
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is a fundamental concept in international
environmental law and policy.28 The emphasis on precautionary principle will be helpful to
set up a strict GMO regulation by preparing for and preventing GMO risks in both GMO
labeling and liability systems. The precautionary principle, one of the Rio Declarations on
Environment and Development (Principle 15), has been adopted in many regional and global
instruments.29 This principle states that the significant risks of current and new technologies
should be anticipated and prevented.30 The anthropogenic harm to human health and the
environment should be avoided or minimized under this principle. In addition, technological
activities should be restricted when their environmental results are uncertain but potentially
serious.31

ORGANISMS 279 (Terje Traavik & Lim Li Ching eds., 2007) (stating that “implementing a precautionary
approach might require a renewed look at the science underpinning risk assessment and management of GE and
GMO release.”).
27

See Applegate, supra note 26, at 75 (stating that “a precautionary principle that expressly permits
regulation while a significant about of uncertainty remains is, therefore, an important bulwark against endless
demands for more information.”). See also Anne Ingeborg Myhr, The Precautionary Principle in GMO
Regulations, in BIOSAFETY FIRST -HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN GENETIC ENGINEERING
AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 458 (Terje Traavik & Lim Li Ching eds., 2007) (mentioning that
“precautionary principle is a normative principle for making practical decisions under conditions of scientific
uncertainty.”).
28

See Applegate, supra note 26, at 13.

29

The Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration was adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992. It provides that “in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.” See MACKENZIE ET AL, supra note 24, at 12-13.
30
See John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle to Harmonize
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 248 (2001).
31
See Applegate, supra note 26, at 13. This precautionary principle has been tamed over time with a
10

Until now, there has been a debate on the interpretation of the precautionary principle
and whether the precautionary principle is an international customary law. However, this
principle plays a very important role in solving international environmental issues and has
been reflected in many environmental treaties. The Biosafety Protocol also reflects the
precautionary principle within some key provisions.32 Meanwhile, even though the WTO
related provisions generally limit GMO regulations, the SPS Agreement (part of the WTO
agreement) includes a provision reflecting the precautionary principle in Article 5.7. The EU
is one of the main countries that has adopted this precautionary principle and has reflected
this principle in its GMO policies. The very strict GMO labeling system in Europe shows
how the EU favors this principle.33

2. Approaches favorable to GMO production

a. Substantial equivalence

Substantial equivalence of GMOs states that GMOs and non-GMOs are substantially
equivalent in biochemical composition. According to this substantial equivalency, if a nonGM product is generally considered safe, then the GM product is also generally considered to
be safe.34 Therefore the US has a GMO-friendly policy, which is explicitly different from the
EU. The US GMO regulation is based on the doctrine that GM products should be regulated

consistent pattern in international and national environmental policy; the variation could be expressed through
trigger, timing, response and iteration. See Applegate, supra note 26, at 16.
32
33

See MACKENZIE ET AL, supra note 24, at 13-14.
See Applegate, supra note 30, at 247.

34

See Dorothy Du, Rethinking Risks: Should Socioeconomic and Ethical Considerations Be
Incorporated into the Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 377 (2012).
11

in the same way as its non-GM counterparts.35 The FDA in the US has adopted the
substantially equivalence concept and maintained this stance today. Under this substantial
equivalence concept, GMO labeling is considered unnecessary, causing the US not to adopt a
GMO labeling system.36 Therefore, countries in favor of this approach are lenient to GMO
development and easily accept GMOs, which also leads the countries to regulate GMOs
passively with existing laws, and not newly proposed laws for GMO regulation.
b. Sufficient scientific evidence-based approach

The approach emphasizing the need for scientific evidence requires there to be a
sufficient amount of scientific evidence to prove GMO risks for regulating GMOs. The US
prefers this approach in order to be favorable towards using GMO products. This approach
allows for technological developments and markets for these new technologies until scientific
analysis proves that scientific risk is apparent.37 Additionally, the WTO also approaches the
GMO issues emphasizing scientific clear and significant evidence, and this approach is
especially consistent with the WTO’s SPS Agreement. As it states in Article 2.2 and 5, and
also known from the panel’s standard of review, the SPS measures should be based on
scientific principles.38 Because this approach essentially requires confirmed scientific
evidence of harm caused by GMOs before the ban on GMOs, this approach is favorable to
countries like the US under the scientific uncertainty principle. In other words, the
requirement of demonstrated scientific evidence and testing results to prove GMO risks under
this approach makes the US reluctant to GMO regulations and favorable to GMOs itself.

35

See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY [PIFB], ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND ANIMALS 3 (2004) [hereinafter PIFB report].
36
See Du, supra note 34, at 392.
37
See Coborn, supra note 19, at 300.
38
See Guy R. Kundsen, Where’s the Beef? How Science Informs GMO Regulation and Litigation, 48
IDAHO L. REV. 225, 241 (2012).
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3. Searching for a middle ground approaches

a. Reconciliation approach

As a country that has experienced a dramatic economic development, South Korea
has played a role to mitigate developed countries and developing ones. Moreover, in an
international society, South Korea is in a position that wants to maintain good interactions
with the US and EU. South Korea’s policy has changed from a negative attitude towards
GMO regulation to a positive one.39 South Korea’s GMO regulations reflect this status of
mitigating and coexisting with both countries to some extent.
As for the GMO labeling regulations, South Korea has the mandatory labeling system
under the LMO Act, like the EU. However, when it comes to the specific implementation of
the LMO Act, South Korea’s regulation is not as strict as EU’s implementation of the
Regulation 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 (the EU’s two main Directives about GMO labeling
system). Therefore, if placed on a spectrum, the GMO regulation policy of the South Korea
could be placed between the US and EU regulation systems.
b. Coexistence approach

Recently, the concept of coexistence has been discussed as a new and flexible
approach for GMO regulations in the EU.40 The European Commission published guidelines

39

At the beginning stages of regulation, the government estimated that GM crops are safe and
substantially equivalent to non-GM products (similar to the US approach). However, the government policy has
shifted to needing GMO regulations after a long period of debates. See SeongEun Cho & SunHyuk Kim,
Institutions, Interests, and ideas as Determinants of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis of GMO Labeling
Policies in the EU, South Korea, and the US, 44-3 SEOULDAEHAKGYO HAENGJEONGNONCHONG [Seoul National
University Korean Journal of Policy Administration] 15-18 (2006).
40

For details on the national implementation (e.g., France, Italy, Spain and UK) regarding
coexistence in the EU, see Luc Bodiguel, Michael Cardwell, Ana Carretero Garcia & Domenico Vitti,
Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional, and Organic Crops in the European Union: National
13

in 2003 for enforcing a coexistence regulation.41 This approach proposes for the coexistence
of traditional crops with genetically modified crops in agricultural environment.42 In other
words, the coexistence policy refers to the farmer’s ability to make choices between
genetically modified, conventional, and organic products that are in compliance with current
European labeling and traceability standards. This enables the moving route of the food to be
followed as a stricter system than just labeling.43 The adoption of this coexistence approach
is helpful to avoid rapid technological substitutions of conventional crops by GM products
and guarantee the survival of organic production.44 In addition, it is also helpful to avoid
economic losses caused by an adventitious mixture, meaning unintended influx of GM seeds
due to natural causes.45 Some measures preventing GM pollen from drifting into other
conventional cultivation fields need to be taken under this coexistence approach.46
The coexistence approach enables consumers’ right to be ensured in the EU’s
labeling system because the integrity of labeling could remain when the intermixing is kept as
minimum as possible. Therefore, this approach has an importance in that it enhances the
consumer’s right to choose between GM products and non-GM products, as well as the
farmer’s right to choose.

Implementation, in THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 166195 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 2010).
41

Freedom of Choice: Selecting The Deliberately Applied System, GMO COMPASS, http://www.gmocompass.org/eng/regulation/coexistence/133.freedom_choice_selecting_deliberately_applied_system.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014).
42

See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional, and Organic
Crops in the European Union: The Community Framework, in THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 123 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 2010).
43
See Grossman, supra note 22, at 325.
44

See Justo Corti Varela, The New Strategy on Coexistence in the 2010 European Commission
Recommendation, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 353 (2010).
45
46

See Grossman, supra note 42, at 130.
Coexistence in Agriculture: Minimising Pollen Traffic, GMO COMPASS, http://www.gmo-

compass.org/eng/regulation/coexistence/134.coexistence_agriculture_minimising_cross_pollination.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2014).
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4. Summary

Looking at the GMO regulation policies broadly within the three countries, it could
be stated that the US has a favorable to GMO (Pro-GMO) policy based on the substantially
equivalent principle. On the other hand, the EU is in favor of GMO regulations based on the
precautionary principle and the coexistence between GMOs and non-GMOs. South Korea’s
policy is currently experiencing changes in its GMO policies. However, it is noteworthy to
recognize that there are critiques on both the radically different US and EU regulations. There
are many in support of considering non-scientific issues surrounding GMOs in the US.47
Likewise, there is an assertion that the precautionary principle, utilized by the EU, should be
specifically defined and not be misused as the protectionism method, which might restrict
trade to defend the country’s interests and benefits.48 Evaluating criticisms on both types of
policies are helpful in finding a middle ground and in closing the gap that still exists between
the US and EU on GMO regulations.

C. Current international laws related to GMOs

The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) and Biosafety Protocol presently
function as the main international environmental norms that regard GMOs.49 Recently, the

47

See Du, supra note 34, at 391-395 (emphasizing a need for incorporating non-scientific concerns,
such as socioeconomic and ethical consideration, into the GMO regulation system, and concludes that these
socioeconomic and ethical externalities would be helpful for attaining a public trust).
48

See Marc Victor, Precaution of Protectionism?, The Precautionary principle, Genetically Modified
organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to Undermine Free Trade, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 295, 321 (2001).
49

Currently, the parties of the CBD are 194 countries. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang=en (last
visited Apr. 1 2014). Additionally, the parties of the Biosafety Protocol are 167 countries. See UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-815

members of the Biosafety Protocol adopted a supplementary protocol (the Liability and
Redress Supplementary Protocol), dealing with the liability and redress of the damage caused
by GMOs in 2010.50 While CBD and Biosafety Protocol are international environmental
laws, WTO related provisions deal with international trade laws for disputes regarding GMO
trade. This section will discuss the key provisions and details for each international
environmental and trade law to further discuss domestic GMO regulations throughout the US,
EU, and South Korea.

1. International environmental laws

a. CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity)
The CBD was adopted on March, 1992 in Nairobi, Kenya.51 The CBD deals with the
conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.52
CBD Article 8(g) stipulates that each contracting party “shall establish or maintain
means to regulate, manage, or control risks associated with the use and release of living
modified organisms.”53 There is also another duty under the Article 19 (4) to “provide any
available information about the use and safety regulations required by that contracting party
a&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
50

The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014).
51

History of the Convention, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/history
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
52

See Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade
Organization: Can The Two Coexist?, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 107, 110 (2000).
53

See Karen M. Graziano, Biosafety Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of the
Environment, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 195 (1996).
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in handling such organisms, as well as any available information on the potential adverse
impact of the specific organisms concerned to the contracting party into which those
organisms are introduced.”54 In addition, the CBD Article 19 (3) imparts a duty upon the
parties involved to consider the need for a protocol, which has led to the Biosafety Protocol
and the most key provision, Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA).55
b. Biosafety Protocol (Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety)

While the CBD takes an important legal step for protecting the intrinsic value of
biological diversity, Biosafety Protocol aims to establish an adequate level of protection in
the field of the safe transfer, handling, and use of GMOs as a protocol of CBD.56 The
Biosafety Protocol especially focuses on the transboundary movement of GMOs and was
adopted in Montreal, Canada, in January 29, 2000. This treaty took effect in September 11,
2003.57
The most salient provision of the Biosafety Protocol is the AIA, provided in Aarticle
7-13. The AIA is mainly comprised of notification, acknowledgement, and risk assessment
procedures. Under these articles, the exporting party that wishes to place GMOs into
international trade must notify the importer’s national authority prior to the first shipment.
The importing party must then acknowledge receipt of the notification.58 In addition, the

54

See Id.

55

See Gareth W. Schweizer, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 6 ENVTL. LAW.
577, 590-591 (2000).
56

See Timothy Josling, International Institution, World Trade Rules, and GMOs, in GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE –ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 127 (Gerald C. Nelson ed., 2001); Darren
Smits & Sean Zaboroski, GMOs: Chumps or Champs of International Trade, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE
L. 111, 124 (2001).
57

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
58
See Brett Grosko, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict or Harmony? An Analysis
of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT, and the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 295,
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Biosafety Protocol, Article 15 refers to the exporting nations’ obligations to undertake risk
assessments based on scientific evidence.59 After these procedures, the importing party has
the right to decide whether or not to import the GMOs from the exporting party. Besides
these provisions, National Focal Point (NFP), Competent National Authority (CNA), and
Biosafety Clearing House are other key provisions that connect contracting parties and share
information about GMO regulations.60
Article 18 and Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol addresses the GMO labeling and
GMO liability systems. Article 18 requires each party to take measures for labeling GMOs
within three categories: (1) GMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing,
(2) GMOs for contained use, and (3) GMOs for intentional introduction into the environment.
On the other hand, Article 27 states that the parties meeting to negotiate shall adopt a process
regarding liability and redress within four years.
The Biosafety Protocol also takes on the precautionary principle, which is the
fundamental concept in international environmental law and policy. The precautionary
approach is expressed in the preamble of the Biosafety Protocol and Article 1 provides an
interpretation in accordance with the precautionary approach.61
c. Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol

The original Biosafety Protocol provides a liability and redress concept in Article 27.
303 (2001); Schweizer, supra note 55, at 598-599.
59

Under the Article 15(1), the risk assessment “shall be carried out in a scientifically sound manner.”
However, there is no definition or international agreement on this phrase. It may cause different interpretation
among countries. See MACKENZIE ET AL, supra note 24, at 107. Furthermore, the Biosafety Protocol Article 16
provides the requirements for risk management. See MACKENZIE ET AL, supra note 24, at 111,
60

The National Focal Point (NFP) and Competent National Authority (CNA) are provided in Article
19. Additionally, The Biosafety Clearing House (BCH), which is an information exchange mechanism for the
implementation of the Biosafety Protocol, is provided in Article 20. See Id. at 129-136.
61

See Grosko, supra note 58, at 304.
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To comply with this, the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol was adopted on
October, 2010. Even though there is no affiliated protocol about GMO labeling under the
Biosafety Protocol, it is encouraging that the supplementary protocol was concluded
regarding GMO liability and redress system. However, the divided negotiation groups were
in debates during the discussions and there still remain many international and national
loopholes that need to be solved. The specific contents of this protocol and future issues will
be examined in Section IV.

2. International trade laws (WTO and related provisions)

The WTO is the largest international trade organization and was established to ensure
free trade between countries. Many WTO related provisions, such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), SPS Agreement, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement), function as standards to regulate international trade. The US
emphasizes the observance of the WTO provisions as the biggest exporting country of GMOs.
First, the GATT related provisions, which deal with special situations about GMO trades, are
founded in the Article 3, 11 and 20 (b). Under the GATT Article 3, the exporting party might
make a violation claim towards the opposing party for the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
treatment.62 GATT Article 11 also provides quantitative restrictions and the exporting party
could argue that the opposing party violated this provision. However, exceptions are provided
under Article 20, which justifies the violation under certain conditions.
In addition to GATT provisions, the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement could be
applied to GMO trade regulations. These agreements deal with trade restrictive measures on
62

See Id. at 307.
19

human, animal or plant health, and technical regulations that include safety standards or
labeling requirements. The SPS Agreement, strengthening GATT Article 20’s exceptions, can
be issued when there is a problem with the GMO bans by the EU against the US.63 Also, the
TBT Agreement is relevant to the GMO labeling system.64 The TBT Agreement provides
“labeling” as one of the technical regulations under its Annex 1. Therefore, the GMO labeling
requirements could be addressed under the TBT Agreement.

D. US, EU, and South Korea’s perspectives and domestic laws for GMO

The different approaches and philosophies on GMOs (explained in Section A) are
reflected in their interpretation and participation of the international environmental laws,
which were reviewed in Section B. Both the EU and South Korea are contracting parties of
the CBD and Biosafety Protocol, making them implement GMO regulations. On the contrary,
the US has not yet ratified the CBD and has not even signed the Biosafety Protocol, making
US regulation the most lenient. These different attitudes by the US, EU and South Korea is
also apparent in the domestic implementation and regulation of GMOs. This section will
address each country’s domestic laws and assess the big gap in GMO regulations to compare
each country’s perspective.
1. US regulation of GMO

Because the US is not a party of the CBD and Biosafety Protocol, these treaties are
not binding authorities to the US. Unlike the EU and South Korea, the US does not have a
63

See Daniel Schramm, The Race to Geneva: Resisting the Gravitation Pull of the WTO in the GMO
Labeling Controversy, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 106 (2007).
64

See Applegate, supra note 30, at 237.
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comprehensive legislation about GMOs and relies on preexisting laws and agencies.65 There
are three primary federal agencies to regulate GMOs in the US: the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).66 These three agencies have their own regulation field, and also
cooperate with each other in order to regulate GMOs.
The USDA regulates Genetically Modified (GM) crops under the Federal Plant Pest
Act (FPPA) and the Plant Protection Act (PPA). Therefore, certain GM crops are classified as
biological control organisms. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) also
plays an important role under the USDA. Before GM crops are moved or field-tested, the
APHIS must be notified.67
The second federal agency is EPA, which regulates the environmental risk-producing
activities. Under the EPA, GM plants are regulated through the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The
FIFRA regulates plants that have been genetically engineered to have pesticide qualities.68
For example, once a Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) corn is introduced, the EPA assesses the risk
of the Bt corn in regards to pesticide qualities of the materials that the Bt corn has or emits.
Under the TSCA, the EPA has the authority to regulate GM microorganisms.
65

See Marc Firestone, A Quick Look at Two Areas of Doctrinal Difference Between EU and U.S.
Decision Makers, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 31-32 (2011).
66

For a comprehensive understanding of the US GMO regulatory system by government agencies,
see generally PIFB report, supra note 35. Additionally, for the detailed regulatory explanation of these three
agencies, see Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology Model for Regulating
the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93 (2007).
67

See Mystery Bridgers, Genetically Modified Organisms and the Precautionary Principle: How the
GMO Dispute Before the World Trade Organization could decide the Fate of International GMO Regulation, 22
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 171, 176 (2004).
68

The pesticide qualities, called biopesticides, include toxicology and allergenicity. It was tested on
more than 10 acres and the EPA regulates genetically engineered plants on the basis of the testing result. The
EPA also sets limits for the amount of pesticides that are allowed in a product, based on product characterization,
allergenicity, potential pest resistance, etc. See Id. at 177.
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The final federal agency is FDA, which was established to protect human health. The
FDA has the authority and responsibility for food safety issues that may be raised by GM
foods. For example, in case of the food made by Bt corn, the FDA evaluates the allegenicity
or toxicity of the GM food. As for the GM food regulation, the FDA generally recognizes GM
food as safe. Therefore, it is subject to regulation only when a food substance is so altered
that the substance is generally recognized as unsafe.69 Under the FDA, there are many laws
related to GMO regulations. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) is the
primary law regarding GMOs and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) is another relevant
law.
These three US agencies, participating in regulating GM crops, plants, and foods, do
not enforce pre-market review and approval, except for a food additive regulation under the
FDA.70 This lack of a central regulation system shows how lenient the US GMO regulation
is.

2. EU’s implementation

The EU has adopted many directives and regulations about GMOs after the EU
became a contracting party of the CBD and Biosafety Protocol in 1993 and 2003, respectively.
The Directive 90/219/EEC regulates the contained use of GMOs and the EU has adopted the
Directive 2001/18, the main regulation system on the deliberate release into the environment

69

See Julie Teel, Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processed: An Overview of
Approaches, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 649, 664-665 (2000).
70

See Donald L. Uchtman, Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation: The Pew Initiative and Its
Stakeholder Forum, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 53, 60 (2004).
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of GMOs, on March 2001.71 This EU Directive addresses the placing of GMOs on the
market, as well as the release of GMOs to the environment. The first reform of Directive
2001/18 took place between 2001 and 2003. This reform resulted in the Regulation
1829/2003, a new legislation on GM food and feed72. The EU also established a priorauthorization for GM products by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), where the
purpose is to conduct a scientific risk assessment of GM food and feed.73
In addition, the EU regulates the intended transboundary movement, which is the
main focus of the Biosafety Protocol. The EU enacted the Regulation 1946/2003 for
transboundary movement of GMOs as an implementation of the Biosafety Protocol.74 Since
the EU already has the Directive 2001/18 that includes the AIA (found under the CBD) for
GMO imports, the Regulation 1946/2003 focuses on the procedures for GMO exports. The
EU also has the Regulation 1830/2003 for controlling GMO labeling and traceability. The
system includes traceability, as well as labeling, and proves how strict the EU’s system is.
The EU’s strong regulation on GMO labeling will be further addressed in Section III.
Recently, the European Commission proposed a new reform to allow a Member State
to restrict the cultivation of GMOs in 2010. There exist a lot of pro and cons regarding this
2010 proposal currently in the EU.75 Known from many directives and regulations, the EU

71
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Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106)
Regulation 1829/2003 2003 O.J. (L 268).
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See Grossman, supra note 22, at 339. See also Arpad Pusztai & Susan Bardocz, Potential health
effects of Foods Derived from Genetically Modified (GM) Plants – What are the Issues?, in BIOSAFETY FIRST HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS 239, 239 (Terje Traavik & Lim Li Ching eds., 2007).
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See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food,
and Feed in the European Union, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 43 (2005).
75

For a favorable evaluation, See Maria Weimer, What Price Flexibility?- The Recent Commission
Proposal to Allow for National “Opt-Outs” on GMO Cultivation under the Deliberate Release Directive and the
Comitology Reform Post-Lisbon, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 345 (2010). But see Laura Moore Smith, Divided We Fall:
The shortcomings of the European Union’s Proposal for Independent Member States to Regulate the Cultivation
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has taken very strict policies on GMO regulation and maintained that stance, taking note the
possible risk on GMOs.

3. South Korea’s implementation

South Korea enacted the LMO Act in order to implement the Biosafety Protocol in
2001.76 It took seven years for this LMO Act to be effective due to the many debates between
agencies and a lack of consensus in public opinions.77 The LMO Act of South Korea
addresses not only the import and export of GMOs, but also the development, production and
risk assessment. One of the main provisions is Article 8. The LMO Act Article 8 first provides
an authorization procedure, where the authorization by a minister of the concerned
administrative agency is required for a person to import GMOs.78 When GMOs or GM
products are imported, the prior approval (a requirement in South Korea) is a precautionary
measure by the government.79 South Korea’s LMO Act reflects the main provisions of the
Biosafety Protocol that helps implement the conditions within the Biosafety Protocol.80

of Genetically Modified Organisms, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L. 841 (2012) (expressing a negative evaluation to the new
EU proposal).
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See JongYeong Lee, Domestic Legislative Framework and Improvement Plan, the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, 27-1 CHUNGANGBEOPHAK [ChungAng Law Review] (2003). The LMO Act was passed in
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date when the Biosafety Protocol comes into force in the Republic of Korea.” However, it was not until
December, 2007 that the South Korea ratified the Biosafety Protocol. Therefore, as of January 1, 2008, both the
Biosafety Protocol and Korean LMO Act became into effect simultaneously in South Korea.
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See WonSeog Park, Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Approaches to LMO/GMO, 12-1
CHUNGANGBEOPHAK [ChungAng Law Review] 262 (2010).
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Laws and Regulations, KOREA BIOSAFETY CLEARING HOUSE,
http://www.biosafety.or.kr/english/laws/The%20Act%20on%20Transboundary%20Movements%20of%20Living%20Modified%20Organisms.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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BAIOSEIPEUTI JEONEOL [Biosafety Journal] 34 (2002).
80

According to implementation of the Biosafety Protocol, the LMO Act put “Ministry of Foreign
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The problem of GMO regulation in Korea is due to the great number of GMO
regulation agencies. South Korea assorts GMOs as agency-related and not by the
characteristics of GMOs itself. In South Korea, there are six involved governmental
agencies81, and the GMOs are categorized by the administrative department (e.g., GMOs used
in the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, GMOs used in the Ministry of
Agriculture & Forestry, and GMOs used in the Ministry of Science & Technology). This
categorization is not consistent with the categorization of GMOs under the Biosafety Protocol.
Another serious problem is that the concerned minister of an administrative agency delegates
the relevant tasks to a lower agency, increasing the number of agencies involved once again.
As a result, there are over ten agencies related to GMO regulation.82 Therefore critics state
that there are too many unnecessary related agencies for GMO regulations, and the
complexity of this GMO regulation system in South Korea might cause confusion among the
agencies.83
The LMO Act of South Korea has specific provisions for labeling policies in Article
24. This is similar to EU’s regulations, even though the specific contents are different. South
Korea has not yet enacted domestic legislation as an implementation of the Liability and
Redress Supplement Protocol. On the other hand, the Directive 2001/18 in the EU does not

Affairs and Trade” as the National Focal Point (NFP) and put “Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy” as
the Competent National Authority (CAN), which are provisions related to the Biosafety Protocol.
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The six involved governmental agencies are (1) Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, (2)
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, (3) Ministry of Environment, (4) Ministry of Health & Welfare, (5) Ministry
of Science & Technology, and (6) Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries.
82

See Park, supra note 77, at 283-286 (mentioning that administrative organization of GMO
regulation in South Korea, such as authorization, designation of risk assessment institution, and notification of
the results, is too complex and excessive).
83

For example, Minister of Agriculture & Forestry could delegate its duty to four different
departments, according to the GMOs used for agriculture, GMOs used for seed, GMOs used for feed, and
GMOs for imports respectively. See Id. at 282.
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address a liability scheme.84 Likewise, the Korean LMO Act does not provide the liability
system but only states in Article 34 the necessity for funds in case damages are caused by
GMOs.
It can be said that South Korea has taken efforts to implement the Biosafety Protocol.
However, South Korea has an excessive amount of government agencies, making the
regulation inefficient. In addition, the South Korea’s substantial GMO regulations do not
meet the EU’s standards until now.

E. The necessity for GMO regulations

As seen in the domestic laws and policies, the three countries’ attitudes differ widely,
and international conferences that sought solutions for the Protocol related to GMOs were
difficult to negotiate because of these conflicting interests. In order to persuade many sides
and establish a reasonable regulation of GMOs, a premise for the exact risk assessment for
GMOs should be recognized. However, the current situation shows that there is a low
certainty and low consensus on GMO risk assessment.85 Therefore, the next step should be to
review whether the GMO regulation is necessary under current scientific uncertainty. Before
doing this, the EC-Biotech case will be addressed as an international case to show the legal
disputes about GMOs and to demonstrate the significance of regulating GMOs.
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See Grossman, supra note 74, at 75.
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See Kaare M. Nielsen & Anne Ingeborg Myhr, Understanding the Uncertainties Arising from
Technological Interventions in Complex Biological Systems: The Case of GMOs, in BIOSAFETY FIRST –HOLISTIC
APPROACHES TO RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
116 (Terje Traavik & Lim Li Ching eds., 2007).
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1. The EC-Biotech case analysis and evaluation on GMO disputes

Reviewing the EC-Biotech case is important because this is the only case that
directly addresses the GMO disputes. Through this case, the conflict between the
international trade laws and environmental laws was identified. This section will analyze and
evaluate the EC-Biotech case. Because the situation has not fully been solved, this section
will suggest reasonable directions for dealing with GMO issues after reviewing the results of
GMO benefits and risks.
a. The EC-Biotech case
The EC-Biotech case was about the European Commission’s trade measures, banning
GMO imports. The US, Canada, and Argentina filed a complaint against the EC’s moratorium
on the approval of biotech products in August 2003. The WTO panel issued a report on the
EC-Biotech case in September 2006 after a long dispute on resolution mechanisms.86 The
panel concluded that the EC’s general moratorium and the product-specific approval delays
resulted in an “undue delay,” violating Article 8 and Annex (C)(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement.87
The panel also found that the individual EC member states’ safeguard measures, prohibiting
specific GM products, violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement by failing to conduct risk
assessments.88 The EC decided not to appeal this panel report. The EC-Biotech case shows
the apparent conflict between GMO trade parties on an international level.
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b. Evaluation and problems of the EC-Biotech case

The results of the EC-Biotech case are problematic. The EC-Biotech case did not
approach the substantial issues, such as whether the GMOs are a risk to humans and the
environment, or whether GM products are in “like product” relationship with non-GM
products.89 The WTO will be forced to answer these issues because the WTO evaded
answering the important issues on GMOs during this case. Additionally, in the near future,
there is a possibility for issues regarding labeling, since the EC-Biotech case did not deal with
labeling system.
The main problem is that the WTO panel drew a conclusion by using only WTO
rules. Therefore, the precautionary principle, which is reflected in the Biosafety Protocol, was
not accepted to solve GMO issues relevant to GMO trades by the WTO panel. In the ECBiotech case, the EU had argued that the CBD and Biosafety Protocol should be taken into
account when trying to ban GMO imports from the US. However, the panel rejected the
argument and concluded that these treaties were not binding on all member countries.90 The
fact that the WTO panel was dismissive of the environmental treaties, such as the CBD and
Biosafety Protocol, and missed an opportunity to embrace the precautionary principle might
have weakened the WTO’s authority.91

89

See BongSuk Sung, The Analysis of WTO Panel’s Decision on Trade Dispute about Biotech
Product, 32-1 MUYEOKHAKHOEJI [Trade Law Journal] 301 (2007).
90

A critical opinion of the WTO panel decision states that “what is missing from international trade
conflict solution is a mechanism to allow these differing national regulatory regimes to be reconciled.” It also
mentioned that “the challenge for the SPS Agreement (and the WTO) is to move beyond the strict wording of
the Agreement to reflect how it can accommodate the complexities arising from divergent national regulation.”
See Joseph McMahon, The EC-Biotech Decision: Another Missed Opportunity?, in THE REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 354 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds.,
2010).
91

See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S.
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775 (2008) (criticizing
28

c. Tension between the trade and environmental treaties

The EC-Biotech case did not propose a clear solution on the conflicts between the
WTO rules and Biosafety Protocol. The tension that currently exists now between the trade
and environmental treaties is bound to become an issue in the future. This conflict and
tension is caused by not having any provision on which the treaty overrules the other one. If
the Biosafety Protocol had stated which provision had priority over the other, there would
have been no problems. However, it is not apparent on how to decide which provision
overrules the other from the current articles of the Biosafety Protocol. The WTO related
provisions do not stipulate the priority between the international environmental treaties and
SPS Agreement articles. Therefore, the relations between the international environmental
norms and trade norms need to be resolved in how they interpret and prioritize the provisions.
Some argue that the WTO system is a better way to manage GMOs than the
Biosafety Protocol from the perspective in favor of a more moderated, risk-based regulatory
scheme. On the other hand, some argue that health and environmental concerns should be
considered more in depth before the WTO. If there is a provision to reflect another treaty’s
principle, it should be carefully considered so that both treaties reduce conflicts and
harmonize with each other.92 As a universal international treaty, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties allows a treaty interpretation method that does not exclude other existing
treaties. Therefore, future provisions should aim for reducing the conflicts caused by
excluding existing treaties by interpreting the international norms equally, similar to the
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.93 For example, the SPS Agreement Article 5.7
reflects the precautionary principle. Therefore, Article 5.7 under the SPS Agreement should
be considered positively and should be broadly interpreted in the WTO.94

2. Reasons for needing GMO regulations

a. The benefits and risks of GMO development

Scholars and scientists have done a lot of research and experiments for more than 15
years since the initial development of GMOs. In order to decide if GMO regulations are
necessary, it is important to look at the opposing sides in regards to the development of
GMOs. Proponents of GMOs point out benefits from the modern technology techniques. First,
GMOs are able to expand the productive capacity and feed the growing human populations.
Second, GMOs could reduce the use of pesticides and herbicides and it would be beneficial to
the environment.95 Third, the supporters of GMOs say that the biogenetically altered
organisms help increase disease resistance, reduce bruising tolerance, and elevate herbicide
tolerance.96
On the other hand, opponents warn about the potential threats of GMOs based on
several factors. First, the rapid biotechnology development disrupts the ecosystems and
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underpins the evolutionary and ecological stability, such as weed proliferation.97 Second,
uncontrolled biotechnology can result in health problems. There is a risk of creating new
viruses and mutations, which could be toxic, allergenic, or dangerous to humans.98 Finally,
GMO skeptics worry about the adverse effects on non-target crops where conventional crops
could be pollinated unintentionally by GM crops by wind or insects.99
Under current circumstances, the claims on whether or not GMOs have a risk are in
direct opposition. It seems that there is not enough scientific evidence to substantially verify
the risk, which is also known as scientific uncertainty. However, the scientific reports and
evidence supporting the risk of GMOs are continually being discovered.
b. Growing need for GMO regulations

The need for GMO regulations can be easily justified with experimental and practical
results, which prove the harms of GMOs to humans and the environment. The results show
that the GMOs are a risk to humans and the environment, even in the US (a country very
favorable to GMO development). In the recent two-year long study by US scientists, they
found that GM corn-fed rats developed tumors and many other health problems.100
Additionally, in the Ecological Society of America conference, researchers stated that GM
canola has been found thriving in the wild for the first time in parts of North Dakota.101
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Another important thing to consider when looking at the necessity of GMO
regulation is the consequences in using GMOs for future generations.102 GMO development
is a relatively recent emergence of GM technology and the extremely limited knowledge
requires an evaluation of the potential risks.103 In addition, many countries are continually
trying to develop new GMOs and GM products (e.g., GM fish or GM insects) beyond the
current limited GMOs, such as corn, tomato, or soybean.104 If the risks caused by the new
GMO developments are not recognized in a timely fashion, the effects would be irreversible.
Therefore, the risk of GMOs should be carefully observed and regulations are needed for the
current and future GMOs.
GMO labeling and liability systems are preventive measures and these systems are
different from the GMO risk assessment and GMO import or export authorization. GMO
labeling and liability systems are needed internationally and domestically, since substantial
scientific certainty is not a prerequisite for these systems. All these things considered, the
GMO regulation is necessary and a stricter regulatory framework in the GMO labeling and
liability systems is required to prepare for GMO risks and create strong foundations for a
legal framework.105
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3. Summary

It is difficult to declare that GMOs are dangerous by looking at past scientific
evidence. However, there have been more accumulated reports and scientific experiments
showing that GMOs have potential risks to humans and the environment. From the ECbiotech case, future conflicts between international trade laws and environmental ones are
inevitable. When a case is brought to the WTO, the panel should consider the environmental
norms as well as WTO rulings. Furthermore, the GMO regulatory systems are necessary,
given the characteristics of potential and irreversible risks by GMOs. The GMO labeling and
liability systems are very controversial, but essential for the future regulation framework.

Ⅲ. GMO labeling system from the EU, US, and South Korea’s policies

A. Current international and domestic regulations

The different approaches and principles toward the GMOs are shown in the GMO
labeling regulations, which reflect the principles mentioned above.106 The US does not
compel specific labeling for products containing GMOs, even though the US permits GMO
labeling on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, the main GMO imports countries, the EU
and South Korea, have shown to favor the GMO labeling system. Currently, about 20
countries (including the EU, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) are enforcing
the mandatory labeling system. However, different standards or details in legislations and
policies among the countries exist, leading to many debates on the labeling system itself, the
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specific methods of labeling, and its consistency with international trade laws (which will be
discussed later in B and C). Before approaching the debates, it is necessary to review the
existing international regulations, focusing on GMO labeling and domestic regulations in the
EU, US, and South Korea

1. Existing international GMO labeling regulations
a. CBD and Biosafety Protocol

The CBD, an international environmental treaty, does not directly mention GMO
labeling and just broadly states that the contracting party should establish regulations on
GMO risks. The labeling system is provided in Article 18 of Biosafety Protocol.107 Article
18.1 provides that each party shall take measures to require living modified organisms to be
handled, packaged, and transported under conditions of safety considering relevant
international rules and standards.108 Under handling, transport, packaging, Article 18.2
contains specific and detailed provisions regarding direct GM food or feed, contained use of
GMOs, and intentional introduction into the environment of GMOs in Article 18.2(a), 18.2(b)
and 18.2(c) respectively.109
Focusing on Article 18.2(a) for GM food or feed, it states that each party shall clearly
identify through accompanied documentation whether they may contain living modified
organisms, had no intention for introduction into the environment, and additional contact
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information for further inquiries.110 There was no consensus for this international regulation
system for GMO labeling until the Biosafety Protocol. However, even though this protocol
was concluded and called for an international regulation system, the contents of GMO
labeling standards has not been specified and no international guideline has been made for
now.
b. The WTO related provisions
The SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement are WTO related provisions and do not
provide requirements or standards of GMO labeling. Instead, the WTO related provisions
propose that the GMO labeling regulations of each country would not constitute a restriction
on international trade. While the SPS Agreement Article 2.1 recognizes the right to take
measures for protection of human health, Article 2.2 also provides that the measures
restricting trade of GMOs shall be based on scientific principles and not discriminate between
members arbitrarily or unjustifiably. This means that GMO labeling measures have to have
scientific reason in order to prove the danger of GMOs when the labeling measure is
pertinent to the SPS measure.111 Additionally, the TBT Agreement states that technical
regulations, such as labeling, shall not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade
under Article 2.2.112
As mentioned above, the different legislative intent between international
environmental laws and trade laws could be found within current GMO labeling regulation.
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For example, an exporting country (i.e., the US) could raise the issue that GMO labeling
regulations of an importing country do not meet the requirement of the SPS or TBT
Agreement. However, the importing country (i.e., the EU) could prove that they meet the
requirements of the SPS or TBT Agreement provisions. This would ultimately lead to conflict
and specific issues will be addressed later on under the discussion of WTO consistency.

2. EU’s approach to the labeling system

The EU’s labeling system is the strictest in the world since its regulation scope of
GMO labeling is broad and detailed.113 In order for consumers to make an informed choice,
the EU adopted two main regulations: Regulation 1829/2003 and Regulation 1830/2003.114
Under the Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food and feed, food products produced from GMOs
should be labeled regardless of whether or not the DNA containing GM content could be
found in the final product.115 Additionally, the Regulation 1830/2003 on the traceability and
labeling of GMOs calls for traceability of GMOs and the monitoring system where food
production industries should comply to indicate the presence of GMOs.116 This is different
from South Korea’s more relaxed labeling system, proving that the EU has the most rigorous
labeling system.
However, the EU does recognize that unavoidable adventitious presence (an
unintentional mixture between GM products and non-GM products of GMO material) could
113
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occur. Therefore, the EU established a 0.9 percent threshold for such products.117 This
standard of threshold is very strict compared to other countries’ threshold (e.g., the threshold
for the adventitious presence of South Korea is 3 percent).
When the threshold is above 0.9 percent, all food containing GMOs are required to be
labeled with specific labeling methods according to the EU’s labeling system. Organisms that
have been “genetically modified” or products that have been “produced from genetically
modified (ingredient name)” are labeled if they are above the assigned threshold level.
Additionally, the EU utilizes the word “contain” in its labeling system. For example, a
product will be labeled as “contain genetically modified (name of organism)” or “contain
(name of ingredient) produced from genetically modified (name of organism).”118 The EU
has also established specific provisions according to how a product is packaged (i.e., whether
packaged or unpackaged; with a list of ingredients or without a list of ingredients).119
From the specific labeling system mentioned above, the EU has coped very well with
the risks of GMOs under the Directives and Regulations, using the precautionary principle.
On the other hand, this system of the EU has a problem of the possibility of inconsistency
with WTO related provisions.

3. US approach to the labeling system

The US enforces a voluntary labeling system and the US government maintains these
labeling policies. The US does not require a special labeling system for GM foods under the
substantial equivalence principle, which states that there is no difference between GMO and
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non-GMOs.
As mentioned in Section II, the US regulates the GMOs or GM products with existing
laws such as PPA, FIFRA, TSCA, and FFDCA. Among these laws, only the FFDCA sets
requirements about food labeling.120 The FFDCA section 403 authorizes the FDA to regulate
food labels.121 However the FDA does not require a mandatory labeling system and
maintains a voluntary labeling system to avoid the possibility of misinforming the
consumers.122 According to the enforcement of voluntary labeling system on GMOs, the
FDA requires the labeling of GM foods only if they are different substantially from non-GM
products.123 In other words, the FDA does not mandate GM food labeling, but instead GM
foods labeling should be mandatory only if they have shown the significant difference in a
way that might pose a risk to consumer, such as a major nutrient change or the presence of
allergenicity.124
The FDA’s lenient attitude on labeling GMOs can be demonstrated in the 1992 Draft
Guidance for Industry called “Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have
Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering” and affirmed in 2001 Draft Guidance for
Industry again.125 The FDA’s policy was challenged by a consumer advocate group who
wanted stricter labeling systems. However, the District Court rejected the claim that the
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FDA’s policy statement was arbitrary and capricious, and concluded that the FDA’s
interpretation of the FFDCA was reasonable.126
In spite of the FDA’s decision against mandatory labeling, there was a movement for
mandatory labeling in some states and they have enacted state laws to require a mandatory
GMO labeling system.127 The movement for a mandatory labeling system has been
continued in ten other states, including California (one of the most active states for a
mandatory labeling system). California would have been the first state in the US to pass an
initiative for a mandatory labeling system for GMOs.128 Recently, Connecticut and Maine
have passed the mandatory labeling laws in a state level. Additionally, Vermont has enacted a
statute requiring milk to be labeled as recombinant bovine somatotropin (bST) when
produced by treated cows with the growth hormone.129 This state law was challenged by
food producers in the federal court. In International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy130,
the second circuit concluded that the law was unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
the manufacturers’ right not to speak under the First Amendment.131
Overall, the US government, federal laws, and courts are still reluctant to enforce a
mandatory GMO labeling system. Finally, the labeling system in the US depends on the
voluntary will by manufacturing firms because there is no obligation to label GMOs. This is
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far from the current international and environmental treaties, as well as the domestic demand
in the US, seen in California, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont.

4. South Korea’s approach to the labeling system

South Korea enforces a mandatory labeling system within the area of GM crops and
GM foods under the LMO Act enacted in 2008 and other preexisting laws. The Korean LMO
Act regulates the labeling system on the stages of development, production, and import of
GMOs. However, before the LMO Act was enforced, the labeling system had been already
regulated by other laws, which consisted of two main parts that enforced mandatory labeling
system.132 One system, implemented by the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MFAFF) addresses the labeling system of GM crops. Korea Food & Drug
Administration (KFDA) implements the other system and it deals with the labeling system of
GM foods.133
The laws and its enforcement ordinances enacted by MFAFF and KFDA state the
labeling requirements for GMOs, such as the person who is obligated to label products, the
items that need to be labeled, and the labeling methods. First, according to the laws and
implementing ordinances on GM crops under the MFAFF, the person who sells GM crops
should label the presence of GM materials. The targeting items for GMO labeling are the
items permitted to be eaten through the GMO risk assessment. The mandatory labeling items
are beans, corns, bean sprouts, canola, cotton, and sugar beet, etc. Second, based on the laws
132
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and implementing ordinances about GM food or additives under the KFDA, the person who
manufactures, processes, or sells GM food or additives should label GM materials, only if
some GM DNA or foreign proteins still remain in it after manufacturing and processing the
product. The GM food required to be labeled is the food that was made and processed by
mainly GM crops such as beans, corns, and bean sprouts.
With regard to the labeling methods, South Korea requires detailed labeling of GM
material in products that contain GMOs. The labeling method under the current South Korean
system for the GM crops is one of the three ways: (1) “genetically modified (the name of
crop),” (2) “containing GM crop,” and (3) “may contain GM crop.”134 These methods for
labeling are the same for all GM foods, which allow consumers to recognize the contents
with ease.135
However, South Korea’s labeling system is not effective due to many exception
clauses, which means the loopholes or exemptions in the mandatory labeling system have
caused lots of conflicts regarding GMO regulation systems. In case of GM crops, regulated
under the MFAFF, there exists a 3 percent threshold. When a crop includes less than 3 percent
of GMO ingredients, the product does not need to have a GMO label. The rational for this
was due to the possibility of GM crops unintentionally mixing with non-GM crops. In order
for the exemption to be valid, the sellers are needed to have a government certification or
evidentiary documents to prove that their products have been managed separately from GM
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products.136
Furthermore, the more problematic situation is found in the exception clauses in the
case of GM food or food additives. If GM materials were not found in the final products, the
products could be excluded from labeling because the mandatory labeling is required only
when some GM DNA remains after manufacturing and processing. This is different from the
EU’s mandatory labeling system, which requires labeling regardless of whether GM DNA
remains after processing. In reality, it is very rare to find GMO labeling in South Korea’s
markets due to this exception clause, even though South Korea enforces a mandatory labeling
system. Other exception clauses include exclusion from labeling if the GM crops were not
included in the five raw materials that were used the most, and foods or food additives that
are manufactured or processed by raw materials containing less than 3 percent of the GM
crops.137
In conclusion, South Korean LMO Act, relevant laws, and enforcement ordinances
have established GMO labeling regulation in detail. However, the mandatory labeling system
is ineffective and nominal because of the exception clauses, limiting the obligation scope to
label in GM crops and GM foods. Therefore, it is necessary to close these loopholes for a
more successful labeling system.
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5. Summary

From looking at the US agency’s passive attitude on GMO labeling regulation and
EU’s active and numerous enactments on GMO labeling system, the US has the most lenient
GMO labeling system and the EU has the strictest and strongest GMO labeling system.
Because the EU is strict with their labeling methods, the goals and ideas of the Biosafety
Protocol are the most agreeable to the EU’s labeling system. It seems that South Korea’s
GMO labeling system is similar to the EU’s labeling system because both enforce mandatory
labeling system. However, South Korea’s GMO labeling system is located more in the
middle of the US and EU’s current labeling system due to the many exception clauses that
exempt products from mandatory labeling duty. An exception clause barely exists in the EU’s
labeling system, and only has the exception of a threshold. Additionally, the number of the
threshold (unavoidable adventitious presence) and the labeling methods of “may contain” or
“GMO-free” exhibit South Korea’s lenient system, compared to the EU. Consequently, the
US does not adopt a mandatory system itself and the EU’s GMO labeling system is almost
too compact with very few exceptions. South Korea, on the other hand, is in the middle of the
regulation spectrum, permitting many exceptions under the mandatory labeling system.

B. An ideal GMO labeling system and specific labeling methods with regard to
consumers’ right to know

This paper’s purpose is to search for the most reasonable international GMO labeling
and liability system. The ideal labeling system should be able to deliver the GMO
information relevant to the food that consumers will be purchasing and ultimately to protect
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consumers’ health. The first step toward this goal would be to decide on whether or not to
generally adopt a mandatory labeling system. Then the next step would be to search for the
efficient and specific labeling methods under the chosen system. Therefore, this section will
discuss which system – mandatory or voluntary – is more efficient and what labeling
measures are appropriate within that system. Additionally, the main discussion for both
questions needs to focus on the concept of strengthening the consumers’ right to know.

1. The necessity of the “Consumer’s Right to Know” reinforces the need for a
labeling system

While the other issues, such as GMO risk assessment or trade restrictive measures,
are connected to the protection of humans and the environment, labeling (one of the GMO
regulations) is unique in that it stresses the “consumers’ right to know.” As mentioned above,
the scientific evidence to prove the complete safety or risk of GMOs is not certain under
current circumstances. However, the important thing to consider in GMO labeling is that it
does not decide how safe or how risky a GMO product is. The purpose of the GMO labeling
system for foods containing GMOs is to let consumers know about the basic and fundamental
information they eat and to let them choose the food products based on the information
provided.138
Supporters for a mandatory GMO labeling system emphasize that consumers have a
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right to know whether or not the food they eat have GM materials.139 Generally, consumers
show the tendency of “process preference” in the market.140 The preference for process could
effectively reflect consumer viewpoints and consumers would be a central force affecting the
market under the process-based activities.141 Additionally, within globalization, consumers
demand for the flow of enhanced information and are not satisfied with the minimal product
descriptions.142 Therefore, legislators or policymakers should not undermine this consumers’
process preference and not presume that it is less valuable than the preference for product.143
When it comes to the preference for process, the consumers’ right to know is essential and the
GMO labeling system is needed. Meanwhile, given the consumers’ role in the market, the
GMO labeling system is necessary. Because each consumer is asked to serve as the
evaluative function in a private market behavior, consumers should be able to obtain
information and the government should not conceal the information valuable to the
consumers for this role.144
Additionally, both the proponents and opponents of GMOs would agree that the
GMOs are consumed by human beings and should thus be helpful for human beings.145 In
this sense, consumers’ intent, whether to buy GM food, has to be respected and the
information on whether the food contains GM material should be available for consumers.
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This will provide them with more choices, allowing them to make better decisions.146

2. Searching for an efficient labeling system: mandatory vs. voluntary

The aim of the labeling system is to give consumers the basic and objective
information under this scientific uncertainty. While the voluntary labeling system allows
companies to choose whether or not to label GM products, the mandatory labeling system
requires the labeling of GM products. Therefore, under the mandatory labeling system, it
explicitly supports the consumers’ right to know about whether the food they choose is a GM
food or contains GM materials.147 Proponents of the mandatory labeling system generally
cast doubt on the safety of GMOs and point out the adverse effects of GMOs on human
beings, including allergic reactions or toxic compound presence. They also state that it is up
to the consumers to decide whether to purchase GM products based on the facts. Therefore,
the consumer’s right to know is best supported in the mandatory labeling system.
Additionally, a mandatory labeling system could be helpful to ensure the consumer’s
right to religion. Some people might object to GMOs because of their religion.148 Therefore,
under the mandatory labeling system, those who are concerned about GMO risks or are
willing to reject GMOs for religious reasons, such as biblical laws, would be able to make
those well-informed decisions.149 Finally, the enforcement of the mandatory system is
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needed to follow the international community’s application of the precautionary principle to
the GMO regulations as well as the domestic demand. Even in the US, there is a strong need
for mandatory labeling system as seen in a survey that shows 94 percent of consumers
wanting to see all GM foods labeled on food products.150
In contrast, advocates for the voluntary labeling system contradict the mandatory
labeling system with various reasons. First, supporters for the voluntary labeling system say
that the special labeling for GMOs is not justified because the information may mislead
consumers, rather than enlightening them.151 They also worry that consumers have less
knowledge on GMOs and would not interpret the information correctly, leading to consumer
confusion. However, it is logical for the government to inform consumers what GMOs are,
the safety and risks of GMOs, and how much GMOs are present in certain foods. This
information provided by the government is fundamental knowledge, and every consumer has
the right to know.152
Second, those who are in favor of a voluntary labeling system also argue that
potential toxicity or new allergens, which are used as reasons for mandatory labeling
proponents, should be directly addressed and be the main concern; not indicating GMOs.
This means that what consumers want to know is not whether or not GMOs are present, but
the toxicity or allergens present in the product. However, the other argument in regards to the
See David Alan Nauheim, Food Libeling and the Consumer’s Right to Know: Give the People What They Want,
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direct indication of allergic action or toxic substances is not persuasive enough, for indicating
the presence of GMOs in general will give this information anyway and the side effects of the
supposed toxins and allergens have not been proven completely.
The final argument for the voluntary labeling system is that the mandatory system
requires a lot of costs to enforce it.153 They argue that the burden of the costs for the
mandatory labeling system is unreasonable because those who do not care about GMOs
should not have to take the burden of costs (even though the beneficiaries of the information
are those who only care about GMOs). However, existing evidence states that the costs are
not as high contrary to popular belief.154
Consequently, the mandatory labeling system is more efficient than the voluntary one,
since it ensures the consumer’s right to know with the consumer’s right to choose and
corresponds with the international and domestic demands.

3. The controversy surrounding specific labeling methods under a mandatory
labeling system

The language used in GMO labeling methods is a main concern for the mandatory
labeling system. The language used, which is written on a certain GM products, plays a key
role in GMO labeling systems. The specific labeling methods and the used languages are
directly connected with what consumers will see and how this will affect the consumers’ right
to know. Some of the languages used in labeling have problems of confusing consumers
rather than providing information about GMOs.
153
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a. Problems of “may contain GMOs” labeling method
The direct indication of GMO content of either “Genetically Modified” or “contain
GMOs” is used under the EU’s labeling system. On the other hand, the GMO labeling system
of South Korea includes labeling items as: “Genetically Modified,” “contain GMOs,” and
“may contain GMOs.”155 Based on these current systems, it is necessary for more concrete
indications in order to meet the consumers’ right to know and not to confuse consumers.
Therefore, appropriate labeling methods should reflect the EU’s current system –
“Genetically Modified” and “contain GMOs” labeling. The labeling of “may contain GMOs,”
which means the possibility of containing GMOs, would be problematic from the perspective
of protecting consumers. Also, it is unnecessary, considering the current high standard of
technology to discern GMO presence. The “may contain GMOs” indication has the flaw that
causes confusion and prevents consumers from choosing a product with the accurate GMO
information.
b. Problems of “GMO-free” labeling methods which is negative and passive

The countries that require a mandatory GMO labeling system directly indicate and
label the content of GMOs.156 As mentioned in the domestic GMO labeling system, the EU
and South Korea are countries that implement mandatory labeling systems and use a method
of positive labeling, highlighting the presence of GMOs. However, the negative and passive
labeling method of “GMO-free” is favored to some producers because it attracts
consumers.157 Even though there is no global consensus in accepting this type of labeling,
some countries are permitting this “GMO-free” labeling under their GMO labeling
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regulations.158 The different attitudes on “GMO-free” labeling show the possibility for future
debates between countries.
The “GMO-free” labeling method, however, has some problems. First, this negative
and passive labeling has a risk in misleading consumers because it will make consumers think
that other products might contain GM products, while the “GMO-free” labeled product is the
only product without GMOs.159 Second, enforcing this type of labeling method should
guarantee that there is zero percent of GMOs in the food.160 Additionally, even though the
condition is guaranteed, this may still lead to consumer confusion. Therefore, it is reasonable
that the permission or expansion of the “GMO-free” labeling methods should be limited,
regardless of a voluntary or mandatory labeling system.

4. Summary

The mandatory GMO labeling system seen in the EU and South Korea is more
efficient than the voluntary labeling system in the US, since it increases the consumers’
opportunities to knowledgeably choose one product when deciding between a GM food and a
non-GM food.161 The preference for the mandatory labeling system is consistent with the
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consumers’ current opinions and desires. Additionally, the EU’s mandatory labeling system is
more reasonable than South Korea’s labeling system. Even though the regulation intensity
and standards in South Korea is in the middle, South Korea’s current GMO labeling system is
not to be suggested as a compromise due to its many problems, such as excessive exceptions
and confusion within its labeling methods. Finally, the EU’s current labeling methods, which
describes the GMO materials as accurately as possible, is the ideal GMO labeling system that
will be the model for the new labeling regulation system, provided that the very strict
threshold and traceability is generously adjusted.

C. Consistency of the EU’s labeling system as an ideal GMO labeling regulation
system under the WTO provisions

Even though the EU’s labeling system is the most reasonable, problems still exist
with its system and need to be resolved regarding the EU’s labeling system’s consistency with
the WTO provisions. The US, EU, and South Korea are members of the WTO, and the WTO
related provisions (the SPS and TBT Agreement) are binding the three countries together. The
issue of consistency is necessary to review due to the high possibility of future conflicts
between the US and EU, as mentioned in the EC-Biotech case (Section II, E). In addition, the
more consistent the EU’s labeling system is to the current WTO provisions, the more likely
the new proposed system (which is less strict than the EU’s, but stricter than South Korea’s)
will be accepted on a global scale. In this section, the EU’s consistency will be analyzed to
disrupt the inconsistency claim given by the US. After explaining the key provisions of the

(stating that it is necessary for the US to enforce a mandatory labeling system. It concludes that consumers
would avoid GM foods in a short amount of time, but they would accept GM food in the long run with informed
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SPS and TBT Agreement, the analysis of the EU labeling system’s consistency with each
relevant key provision of the SPS and TBT Agreement will be examined.

1. Current requirements and key provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreement

Prior to the evaluating the consistency of the EU with the WTO, the applicable rules
within the WTO provisions need to be determined. The rules that apply to this GMO labeling
issue are the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, which were concluded in the Uruguay
Round.162 The US could hypothetically try to challenge the two agreements and its
consistency to the EU’s labeling system. The GMO labeling requirement is more likely to be
categorized as a technical measure, even though the labeling measure ultimately aims to
protect human health and the environment as a SPS measure. In this paper, the two
agreements will be addressed in regard to the EU’s consistency with them.
a. The SPS Agreement

The main focus of the SPS Agreement is the emphasis of the scientific evidence to
justify the given measure.163 When a WTO member’s labeling regulations are evaluated as a
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to protect human health, the regulatory measures should
be based on scientific standards.164 The emphasis on the scientific criteria of the SPS
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Agreement is confirmed in many of the provisions, such as Article 2.2 and 5.7. The key
provision will be whether or not the scientific evidence would be suggested sufficiently under
the Article 2.2. The GMO labeling regulations should be necessary for a member country’s
sanitary goal, which is scientifically and sufficiently supported under Article 2.2.165
Meanwhile, Article 5.7 regulates the situation when relevant scientific evidence to justify the
SPS measure is insufficient, which includes the precautionary principle.166 Therefore in a
situation that a case is pertinent to scientific uncertainty, the main debate will be the
application of Article 5.7, which permits interim measures within a reasonable period of time.
There are two other requirements besides the requirement relevant to science. Article
2.3 states that the labeling requirements as sanitary measures should not discriminate WTO
members as arbitrary or unjustifiable, which is called the no discrimination duty.167
Additionally, the harmonization clause under Article 3 states that the labeling measures
should meet the international standards, such as the Codex Standards,168 which is called
harmonization duty. Therefore, the key provisions under the SPS could be summarized with
three requirements: (1) scientific evidence requirement under Article 2.2 and 5.7, (2) no
discrimination duty under Article 2.3, and (3) harmonization duty under Article 3.
b. The TBT Agreement

If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body considers the labeling requirements as a
regulation of the product itself, the TBT Agreement will be reviewed.169 Some believe that
the labeling regulations should meet the TBT Agreement requirements because the labeling
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regulations are hard to be evaluated as sanitary measures by the definition in Annex A of the
SPS Agreement.170 Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not call for
scientific evidence.171 Instead, the TBT Agreement Article 2.2 provides a legitimate objective
and that “technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective.” Article 2.1 also requires a WTO member not to discriminate domestic
and imported products through the technical regulations.172
Therefore, the requirements of the TBT could be summarized with two elements: (1)
the legitimate objective and the less trade-restrictive measure for accomplishing the objective
under Article 2.2 and (2) the no discrimination duty under Article 2.1

2. The EU labeling system’s consistency with the SPS and TBT Agreement

The labeling regulation of the EU, in which the mandatory labeling system and strict
labeling methods are implemented, would be justified only if the SPS or TBT Agreement
requirements are satisfied. Even though the EU’s strict labeling system is reasonable and
ideal, it would be of no use if the EU’s labeling regulations were not consistent with the WTO
rules. Additionally, the consistency should satisfy all the relevant provisions of the key
provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreement because just a violation of one provision causes
the violation of WTO rules.
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a. Consistency with the SPS Agreement

In regards to first requirement, it might be difficult for the EU to prove the
consistency with the SPS Article 2.2 directly. However, it is highly possible for the EU to
assert the scientific uncertainty under the Article 5.7 and to prove the consistency with the
SPS Agreement.173 In other words, the EU’s argument could be more persuasive when the
Article 5.7 relevant to the precautionary principle applies to the GMO labeling issue, rather
than the application of the Article 2.2. In addition to the necessity of labeling systems when
scientifically uncertain, the EU could also show experimental results, which prove the real
threats to humans and the environment as available scientific evidence.174 According to the
current evaluation on the GMO risks, the scientific evidences, which warn about the potential
and negative effects of GMOs to humans and the environment, have been presented and the
real threats are actually shown in some countries.
Additionally, in regards to the second requirement of no arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, the EU could assert that the same labeling regulations are applied to GMOs in
the EU domestically.175 Finally, the possible argument from the US with regard to the
international standard is that the EU’s labeling requirements are not based on the Codex
standards because the Codex standards recommend a mandatory labeling system when
GMOs are materially different from non-GMOs products.176 However, EU can argue that
their labeling system is consistent with the Codex standards on the ground that GM products
are materially different from their natural products, which is a contrary interpretation by the
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US.177 A lot of countries are already moving towards the consensus for needing mandatory
GMO labeling and specific labeling methods. The future international trend will continue to
insist on strengthening the GMO labeling regulation systems, which will be enforced through
international standards like the Codex guidelines.178
Consequently, considering all these supporting reasons by the EU, the EU’s GMO
labeling system satisfies the requirements of the SPS Agreement. It might be difficult for the
EU to prove the consistency with Article 2.2 directly. However, it is highly possible for the
EU to assert the scientific uncertainty under Article 5.7 and to prove the consistency with the
SPS Agreement.
b. Consistency with the TBT Agreement
When looking at the TBT Agreement’s consistency with the EU’s labeling system on
its own, the problem of whether the GMOs and non-GMOs are “like products or not” needs
to be solved since the TBT Agreement is applied only on like products.179 It is a
controversial issue and has not been settled.180 Some argue that GMOs and non-GMOs are
“like products” when they are analyzed with four criteria: properties, nature and quality, enduses, consumers’ taste, and habits.181 This opinion is favorable to the US because “like
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products” should be premised for the argument for labeling regulations’ inconsistency with
the TBT Agreement. On the other hand, there exists a different prediction that GMOs and
non-GMOs are not “like products” and the US might have a disadvantage in the “like
products” debates.182 This argument will be the EU’s best defense because the US will not
be able to argue the inconsistency of the EU’s labeling regulations with the TBT
Agreement.183 This paper will presumes that they are “like products” for the hypothetical
discussion of consistency with the TBT Agreement.
In regards to the first requirement of the legitimate objective and less trade-restrictive
measure, the EU could assert that the goal of the GMO labeling requirements is a legitimate
desire for a uniform regulation due to the different implementation between European
individual states. Also, the objective of protecting consumers would be a legitimate goal.184
In response to this argument, the US could argue that the GMO labeling requirements of the
EU are unnecessary obstacles to international trade.185 However, the EU would have counter
arguments against the US. First, the EU labeling requirements are necessary obstacles to
trade because the EU’s labeling requirements could function to make the import of GMOs
easy in the EU.186 The other reason is that the labeling requirements could include technical
measures that are significantly less restrictive than GMO imports bans. Therefore, the EU’s
labeling requirements meet the requirements of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
Additionally, the labeling requirements of the EU satisfies the non-discrimination
obligation under the TBT Agreement Article 2.1 since the methods of GMO labeling do not
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require the disclosure of excessive information enough to discriminate the GM products of
the US. Therefore, the EU’s labeling system does not violate Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement. In conclusion, the EU satisfies both TBT Agreement Article 2.2 and 2.1.

3. Summary

GMO importing and exporting countries have very different labeling systems, which
leads to conflicts. With regard to GMO trade, the potential conflict could occur when a
country applies domestic GMO labeling requirements to internationally imported GM
products.187

The US could bring a claim to the WTO against the EU’s GMO labeling

regulations in the near future and the issue of the EU’s consistency with the WTO provisions
will be raised. According to the application and analysis of this paper, current EU’s GMO
labeling regulations do not violate the WTO provisions and is consistent with several
provisions of the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement.
Naturally and logically, South Korea’s GMO labeling system will be consistent with
WTO provisions because South Korea’s system is less strict than the EU’s labeling system.
The scholars in South Korea state that the current labeling regulations of the South Korea are
not problematic when it comes to the WTO provision consistency issue. However, there is
room for more discussion on the GMO-free labeling with regards to South Korea, which
remains a controversial issue.
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D. Possible future approaches for an ideal GMO labeling system regarding the
current dissonance between countries

1. Broad review of the three countries’ labeling system

As seen from each country’s domestic laws and policies on GMO labeling, the US,
EU, and South Korea have different views on GMO labeling. It is hard to conclude which
labeling policy is the most reasonable, but it could be said that the EU’s GMO labeling
system is the most effective for protecting consumers’ right to know.
Though there are lots of GM products in the US, the consumers’ right to know is not
effectively guaranteed due to the lack of mandatory and accurate labeling. Its voluntary
labeling is neither effective without manufacturers’ or corporations’ active participation, nor
consistent with the international flow, which is moving toward to mandatory labeling system.
Additionally, the enforcement of voluntary “GMO-free” labeling is not recommended since it
can confuse consumers.
In case of the EU, it satisfies consumers’ right to know by providing information
through strict GMO labeling. The EU enforces traceability to increase its effectiveness. The
regulatory range of labeling is wide and specific, and the EU aims to apply the labeling
system to almost all GMOs. The consumers’ right to know and choose can be effectively
guaranteed by enforcing and managing such a strong labeling system. However, since the
EU’s approval of GMOs is extremely limited, consumers have less of an opportunity to
encounter GMOs.
Similar to the EU in the aspect of laws and policies, South Korea prepares the
specific labeling measures and enforces a mandatory labeling system. However, its labeling
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system is not properly working due to many exemptions and loopholes. It is necessary to
make efforts to narrow down the range of exemptions in order to be similar to the EU’s
labeling system. Additionally, even in the case of GM food, it is advisable to determine the
exemption after considering the importance of GM materials in the whole raw materials,
rather than saying that it is not included in the top five ranking of material contents.

2. Possible future approaches for mediating future conflicts (proposal for the GMO
labeling system eliminating South Korea’s drawbacks and weakening EU’s strict
policies)

The current GMO regulations are different in the three countries from its large frame
to detailed matters. In order to reduce the resistance between nations, a phased approach is
needed and it is important to seek for an interface that could be internationally acceptable.
The labeling system is one of the preventive regulations based on the precautionary principle,
and the GMO labeling regulation is realized as the most effective under the EU’s system.
Additionally, the EU’s current labeling system could be considered as being in accord with
WTO rules, such as the SPS and TBT Agreement.
However, too strict of a labeling system can be a cause for international conflicts. For
example, there is a critique that the EU’s standard on unintentional mixing of GMOs (a 0.9
percent threshold) is too excessive and much stricter than other countries, considering the
characteristic of GMOs.188 The threshold is critical because it is directly connected with the
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obligation and exemption for labeling. As for the threshold in South Korea, the current
regulation of 3 percent is sufficient, even though other countries that enforce mandatory
labeling system use a 5 percent threshold. Therefore, the EU’s GMO regulation and labeling
policies should not progress towards a more rigid system.

3. Recommendations for South Korea’s labeling system

To meet the proposed ideal GMO labeling system, it is necessary for South Korea to
correct some problems. There are hot debates on the expansion of GMO labeling in South
Korea but it is more important to fix the current problems prior to the expansion of GMO
labeling system. The excessive exceptions are a big problem in South Korea. It is necessary
to reduce the exceptions and loopholes. The labeling ways of “may contain” or “GMO-free”
do not help to improve the consumers’ right to know and even confuses the consumers.
Finally, South Korea has to pay more attention to the international trend for finding the global
standards of GMO labeling and cooperate with other countries through clearing house
continuously. South Korea needs to revise domestic laws in order to reduce excessive
exceptions that is preventing the effectiveness of the laws and should be similar to the EU’s
labeling system. However, it is also required to maintain the current threshold because the EU
is too strict on it.
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Ⅳ. GMO Liability and Redress System

A. Current international norms on GMO liability regime and the recent Liability and
Redress Supplementary Protocol

As seen in Section II, the Biosafety Protocol is the main global agreement that
regulates the transboundary movement of GMOs. Its goals involve the safe treatment and
management of GMOs under the precautionary principle. However, the Biosafety Protocol
does not offer the substantial provisions necessary for liability and compensation, which
would provide standards in case the damages resulted from GMOs. The GMO liability and
redress is a very delicate issue and it is difficult to draw an agreement in the area of GMO
liability and compensation. After highly debated discussions, parties did succeed in adopting
the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol in 2010. Even though the adoption of this
protocol itself is a positive outcome, there still remains a lot of room for improvement. A
review and evaluation of this current Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol will be a
fundamental task, before looking for a reasonable GMO liability and compensation system.

1. The CBD and Biosafety Protocol

The CBD is an international environmental treaty that aims for protecting the
biological diversity. CBD’s Article 14 mentions the necessity of reviewing the liability and
redress issue on the damage of biodiversity. This article deals with broad concepts of
biodiversity damage and does not directly focus on the specific harms caused by GMOs, even
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though both of them have things in common.189 Meanwhile, The Biosafety Protocol, which
comes from the CBD and focuses on the transboundary movement of GMOs, states that the
liability and redress issue for the damage results from the transboundary movement of GMOs
in Article 27.190 Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol calls for the parties to establish
procedures for addressing liability and redress caused by GMO transboundary movement and
recommends that this task be completed within four years.191 The CBD and Biosafety
Protocol both state a general liability and redress system, but lack specific and substantial
contents on damage caused by GMOs.

2. The adoption of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol

There have been many efforts in order to perform a duty under Article 27 of the
Biosafety Protocol. The parties within the Biosafety Protocol have negotiated to make a
harmonized liability and redress framework, preparing to protect human health and prevent
environmental damage caused by GMOs.192
The first Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to establish the “Working Group”
in order to address the liability and redress regime. Since then, the “Working Group” has met
five times from 2005 to 2008.193 Additionally, the fifth meeting of the “Working Group”
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suggested the formation of the “Friends of the Chair Group” to overcome any difficulty of an
agreement. Only some of the main parties participate in negotiating, within this “Friends of
the Chair Group” to mediate disagreements.194 This effort shows the difficulty in coming to
an agreement and concluding a protocol in the field of liability and redress systems. Until the
fourth COP, parties failed to agree on the adoption because of conflicting debates between
developing and developed countries.195 However, in the fifth COP, the Liability and Redress
Supplementary Protocol was adopted on October 15, 2010 in Nagoya, Japan.196

3. The main contents of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol

The precautionary principle is the basic concept of the Liability and Redress
Supplementary Protocol, similar to the Biosafety Protocol.197 The main provision reflecting
this principle is “response measures.” The preamble includes the provision that recognizes
the necessity of a response measure in case there is a damage or sufficient likelihood of
damage. The specific contents and requirements of the response measures are described in the
Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol Article 5. Under Article 5, the private operator
is required to inform a competent authority immediately, evaluate the damage, and take
appropriate response measures. A competent authority should then identify the operator,
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evaluate the damage, and decide the response measure the operator should take. The domestic
law implements these response measures. Known from this procedure, the response measures
emphasize on the action by the State from the perspective of an administrative approach.198
The definition of the damage is particularly important because it is connected to a
range of the application and compensation scope. The Liability and Redress Supplementary
Protocol defines the damage as an “adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity” and also considers the “risks to human health.” Therefore, the damage of
the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol includes property damage, human health
damage, and environmental harm, such as biodiversity damage, but it does not just include
the possibility of damage.199
The Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol provides a civil liability system,
which enables to make a claim against the operator. Article 2(2) (c) states the operator is any
person who controls GMOs directly or indirectly and exemplifies operators, such as a permit
holder, developer, producer, notifier, exporter, importer, carrier, etc. Two exemptions to the
operator’s liability described in Article 6 are: Act of God (or force majeure) and Act of war
(or civil unrest). However, it is possible for a contracting party to provide other exemptions
under Article 6.
The noteworthy feature of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol is that it
remains in many important areas, such as the areas that should be resolved by domestic law,
including the response measures and exemptions. The specific areas that should be resolved
by domestic law include causation, time limits, and presence of financial stability. First,
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domestic laws should establish the factors of causation. A causal link between the damage
and GMOs is the main element that is required in a lawsuit, regardless of fault-based and
strict liability standards. Second, contracting parties could set time limits for a lawsuit. Third,
the presence of financial security, such as a liability fund, depends on the domestic legislation.

4. Evaluation of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol

The adoption of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol does include some
positive aspects. First, the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol makes countries
predict liability standards in GMO related lawsuits as an international unified norm, which
leads to increased GMO trades.200 In addition, from the perspective of the exporting country,
the state or companies relevant to GMO development will try to follow the rules of the
Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol. The importing party will become friendly to
the GMO import due to the guaranteed liability system.201 Both parties involved in GMO
trades could feel more comfortable with the predictable liability agreements and it will help
increase GMO trades.
However, critics say that the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol failed to
set forth an international liability and redress standard by assigning the role to the domestic
country’s legislation.202 In other words, despite the necessity of substantive international
standards, the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol does not provide the uniformity
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in the field of GMO liability and redress by just providing a process-oriented regime.203
Consequently, the different domestic laws might cause conflicts and forum shopping
problems in the international civil actions.204 This result of failure in adopting international
civil liability guidelines is contrasted to the other international protocols, which have
established strict liability standards in oil pollution liability or nuclear accident liability,
etc.205

B. Possible framework on a new GMO liability and redress regime

A reasonable international model for GMO liability is necessary due to the lack of
efficiency in the currently concluded protocol. In order to form a well-functioning GMO
liability regime, the broad framework should be well equipped. Also, the standards on
specific judicial issues that might be raised in a real lawsuit should be established. The latter
of each litigation topic will be addressed in Section C. This section will look into the possible
wide approach of state responsibility, civil liability and state liability. Then, an effort to create
a reasonable approach for enhancing the effectiveness of the GMO liability and compensation
will be discussed. In order to analyze each system, it is necessary to examine the existing
environmental liability protocols, which could be a role model for GMO liability regime.
Additionally, this section will examine the need for a fund, along with the wide approach on
the liability framework, which will improve the effectiveness of the liability system. Also, a
fund system from existing environmental liability protocols could provide this problem with
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some insight to the discussion of needing a fund.

1. Characteristics of other current liability regimes in the international
environmental laws

The necessity of an international liability regime has been recognized in the
international environmental laws system, as shown in the Declaration 22 of 1972 Stockholm
Declaration.206 Especially, the risk and harm of nuclear accidents or oil contamination
accidents, where the environmental damage occurs outside its territory, increased the need for
an international liability regime. The international environmental treaties in the area of a
nuclear and oil pollution have addressed the liability issue and established a civil liability
regime, not a state liability.207 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention) also adopted a civil
liability regime as a supplementary protocol titled: the Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation Resulting from the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal (Basel Liability Protocol).
In short, states have established a liability and compensation regime based on
international environmental treaties. The established liability regime (in the area of nuclear,
oil pollution to transboundary movements of hazardous wastes) features a civil liability
regime.
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2. Reasonable options for the GMO liability and redress regime: state
responsibility, civil liability and state liability

Many broad approaches to the liability regime have been discussed in many treaties,
as well as in the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol. The possible options are state
responsibility, civil liability, and state liability.208 Each of them has its own function and one
option does not necessarily exclude the other option. This section explains the definition and
role of each option and then looks at what the most reasonable option is for the GMO liability
and redress regime.
a. State Responsibility

State responsibility could naturally apply as an established principle in international
law. In international laws, a state is responsible when there is a commitment of a breach, an
internationally wrongful act by violating codified international laws or rules of customary
international laws.209 A state is obligated not to cause transboundary environmental harms
and this principle could be accepted as a customary international environmental law.210
Therefore, if a state violates the obligation under the Biosafety Protocol or fails to exercise
due diligence to prohibit individuals from causing harms, the state is responsible for its
conduct and should compensate for the damage occurred to other states.211 State
responsibility is still meaningful in case the protocol is insufficient for certain situations, even
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though a liability regime set forth a civil liability regime.212 As an example, the Basel
Liability Protocol acknowledges the need for state responsibility and provides that this
protocol has no influence in the state responsibility in Article 16.213 Likewise, the Liability
and Redress Supplementary Protocol also states that this supplementary protocol does not
affect the state responsibility in Article 11.
However, the state responsibility role is not critical in the environmental liability
regime due to uncertainties.214 The state responsibility has its own applicable area and the
role of the state in liability and damage compensation internationally should be emphasized
because it encourages states to follow the global environmental norms.
b. Civil Liability as the general liability system

When the damage occurred is against humans and the environment, it is reasonable
for the person who controls the hazardous source and causes the damage to assume a liability
for it. Primarily, the liability could be tort liability caused by transboundary pollution by
private actors. Many predecessors, which adopt a civil liability, show that the civil liability
regime is the most persuasive approach in international liability and compensation for
damages caused by an operator.215 This civil liability, which holds a private operator to
account, is consistent with the “polluter pays” principle established in the EU.216 The
“polluter pays” principle means that the burden to be liable for damage should be placed on
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the private operator who uses and deals with GMOs directly.217 Under the civil liability
regime, it is possible that there exist numerous operators related to the human and
environmental damage accidents. The specific problems with regard to liable parties and the
relationship between the private operators involved will be examined in Section C.
Civil liability system can directly provide victims with monetary remedy.
Additionally, this system can force biotechnology firms related to GMO development to be
careful of the harms that might be caused by GMOs. However, civil liability system is also
not complete and shows weakness when private actors, who are liable, are insolvent.
c. State liability and Residual State Liability

State liability means that a state is obliged to be liable for the harmful consequences
of hazardous activities, even though the state did not violate international laws. For example,
there is no violation in operating a nuclear plant close to a border, but the state could be liable
for the radioactive contamination damage to a neighboring injured state.218 When it comes to
discussing state liability, two approaches are possible: primary state liability and residual
state liability.
The residual state liability emphasizes the role of state liability as a subsidiary
liability system to the civil liability regime. A state liability system is necessary, but the
“residual state liability” system is more recommendable than the primary state liability. It is
because the key role of state liability is to support the civil liability system, and the civil
liability system is the most effective in forming a direct remedy to the injured, which reflects
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the polluter pays principle.
Opponents to the state liability say that the intervention by a state is not reasonable
when the private party is responsible for the damage. However, state liability could support a
civil liability system and also function well when the operator is not identified, as well as
deemed insolvent. It is very burdensome and difficult for operators to compensate for all the
damage occurred unless the operator can afford to redress as a conglomerate.219 Additionally,
the fact that states are involved in the transboundary movement of GMOs by developing,
exporting, and approving them, is a key reason for them to be involved and justifies the need
for state liability. This will ultimately lead to a complete and thorough liability system.
d. Conclusion for a reasonable GMO liability and redress regime

In order to follow the current environmental liability regime and at the same time
enhance the effectiveness of the liability system, it is reasonable to adopt the civil liability
system as a main compensation scheme and supplement it with the state liability system. The
adoption of civil liability regime does not exclude the other options, and it would be
strengthened by the supplement of a state liability regime. Other countries have suggested
this solution to possible fill the gaps in the civil liability regime.220 Additionally, the civil
liability system supported by a state liability system is helpful in establishing a thorough
GMO liability system. Even though there are only a few real cases, the through liability
system is necessary since the scope of damage caused by GMOs might be more serious than
expected. There are several loopholes if only a civil liability system was used. For example,
there is a possibility of establishing a sham company to avoid the liability. It is also possible
219
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for a legitimate business being incapable of compensating the damage. Therefore, a state
liability system supporting a civil liability system will help close the loopholes (e.g., sham
company or insolvency problems) that the civil liability system used alone might cause.
Therefore, a subsidiary liability by state is necessary for effective judicial remedies
for the injured party, which will help call both an operator’s and a state’s attention.221

3. Need for an international fund for damage compensation caused by GMOs

a. Insurance as a financial security method and its evaluation

The first possible system that could be utilized as a full and adequate compensation
system is insurance. The Nuclear treaties and Basel Liability Protocol require operators to
take out insurance in case the harms occur in their nuclear facilities.222 The oil pollution
treaties also require operators to maintain insurance, and the ship operators should obtain
insurance according to the oil tonnage or size of the ship.223 The insurance system could be
successful only when the accurate damage quantification is guaranteed, but it is not easy to
quantify the environmental damage.224 Therefore, the insurance system is not a good option
in regards to GMOs. Finally, in the current GMO liability regime, the international fund by
the biotechnology industry is more recommendable than the insurance system (even though
the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol just provides the right to retain financial
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security by parties).225
b. The function of a fund

The international fund for damage can be a method to compensate the injured party
when the responsible party is insolvent or is not found.226 The scope of the damage and the
amount of compensation could be much larger than expected, especially in environmental
damage, which makes the person liable for damage insolvent. When there is a limit within the
relevant treaty and the liability exceeds the limit, a fund could cover the damage and give
compensation to the injured party.227 Another possibility of insolvency is that a shell
biotechnology company might be established by a multilateral biotechnology enterprise. 228
In preparation for these cases, the fund will be the way to guarantee adequate
compensation. Therefore, it is necessary, regardless of whether the liability system is fault or
strict liability.229
c. The function of an international fund

An efficient and full compensation should be ensured in the international level, as
well as the domestic level. Compensation will consider the possibility of a wide range of
damages and involve a considerable sum of money. Each country would establish its own
financial security system reflecting their own financial circumstances, since the Liability and
Redress Supplementary Protocol provides the right to provide for financial security according
225
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to their domestic law. Therefore, a global fund is needed for the efficiency of the liability
system, besides the different domestic financial security methods.
Opponents of a fund system in the international environmental laws say that it might
weaken the damage deterrent. However, it could be contradicted by the fact that GMO trade
and transboundary movement occurs frequently in current circumstances and deterrence is
meaningless, especially in case of GMOs.230
d. A specific issue for the fund enforcement (by whom the international fund be
raised)

The fund is set up by relevant industry parties, such as multinational biotechnology
businesses that produce GM products and other operators. For example, the oil industry pays
contributions to the fund under the Oil Pollution Fund Convention.231 It is necessary to adopt
an international fund in the GMO liability system, like the fund in the Oil Pollution Fund
Convention. It is important to note that this fund-raising by relevant operators is consistent
with the polluter pays principle.

C. Specific judicial issues under international civil liability lawsuits when considering
a new Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol

The recently concluded Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol has failed to
create standards or guidelines on each potential judicial issue, but the need for international
consent still remains. This section aims to propose a reasonable GMO liability regime as an

230
231

See Kohm, supra note 189, at 172.
See NIJAR, supra note 210, at 67.
75

international model in addressing each liability issue. This section will look into the
hypothetical situations related to the GMO liability lawsuit that could become issues between
the different countries. Additionally, reflecting the GMO characteristics and fundamental
principles that the Biosafety Protocol and Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol are
based on will also help create an effective GMO liability system.

1. Hypothetical situations to consider for possible GMO liability lawsuits

The hypothetical situations show that a variety of damages caused by different kinds
of GMOs might occur and these damages need to be compensated for. Predicting some of the
possible situations is meaningful in order to address legal issues and to find better solutions in
the circumstance that there is an actual international lawsuit related to GMO damages.
Hypothetical situations in this section are between two or more countries since the Liability
and Redress Supplementary Protocol aims to cover the liability issues caused by the
transboundary movement of GMOs (like Biosafety Protocol).
The first hypothetical situation that could occur involves GMO damage to the
biodiversity due to intentional introduction into the environment. After exporting the GMOs
made for intentional introduction into the environment, the GMOs could cause damage to the
biodiversity, creating super weeds due to the genetic superiority and destroying the habitats of
other native organisms.232 Additionally, this could involve the possibility of GMOs, meant
for intentional introduction, being introduced into the environment by accidentally flowing
out to a third country during the movement from the exporting country to the importing
232
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country. This eventually leads to environmental damage in the third country.233 Second, the
environmental damage accidents could happen during the transboundary movement of GMOs
for contained use. The environmental harm, such as air, water and soil pollution, might occur
in the destination country, and also occur in a third country by an unintentional leak accident,
similar to the first case.234 Third, the human health damages could arise in the trade of GM
products and GMOs intended for direct use as food or feed. Therefore, the GM food or feed
imported could cause allergen reactions to the importing countries’ consumers who eat it.235
Seen from these hypothetical situations, the damages include potential environmental
harms, as well as becoming harmful to human beings. Also, the damages caused by GMOs
are presumed to happen in all types of GMOs, even in the country that the GMO movement is
not intended for originally. These hypothetical situations show that the GMO liability regime
is necessary to cover all types of GMOs and GMO damages in order to give an effective and
sufficient relief of damage to an injured party or consumer of GMOs.

2. The uniqueness of GMO liability regime and principles to consider

For a more effective and efficient liability system, the uniqueness of GMO liability
(including the uniqueness of GMOs) and key relevant principles have to be reviewed. As the
multilateral environmental treaties that address other areas (e.g., nuclear, oil and hazardous
wastes) have come up with their own liability regimes to reflect the characteristics of each
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respective field, the GMO liability system should most definitely include the uniqueness of
GMOs, due to its scientific uncertainty. Another consideration in creating a GMO liability
system should be based on the fundamental principles that have already been established in
the international environmental law and liability law.
a. Characteristics of GMO liability

As seen in Section II and Section III, there exists scientific uncertainty on whether
the GMOs are a risk to human health and the environment. Under this scientific uncertainty,
the GMOs have been developed by multinational conglomerates (such as Monsanto) and
have shown a dramatic expansion in planting and exporting.236 The GMO liability states that
if the damage caused by GMOs is realized, the damage may be serious and irreversible,
which actually make the evaluation and compensation for the damages difficult.237 Another
feature of GMO liability is that the GMO risk is latent and it may take a very long time for
the risk to be realized after the transboundary movement. This uniqueness could make
proving the causal link difficult.238 In the process of transboundary movement of GMOs,
many parties could be involved as operators, including manufacturers, exporters and
importers. Therefore, in determining who is liable for the damage, the channeling of the
liability should be considered.239
The litigious issues of GMO liability, which will be discussed, should reflect the
current uniqueness of GMOs, such as a lack in scientific certainty, irreversible damage, long
period effects, and multiple operators. The system reflecting these GMO characteristics could
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make the GMO liability system more efficient and compromising.
b. Use of “polluter pays” principle and precautionary principle

In order to create reasonable international GMO liability standards, these standards
have to be based on fundamental principles of the existing international environmental
principles. The “polluter pays” principle means the polluter who controls the pollution source
should take the burden of paying compensation. The Rio Declarations on Environment and
Development (Principle 16) provides this principle. Some say that the strict liability system is
more consistent with the “polluter pays” principle than fault liability.240 However, the
“polluter pays” principle does not have a direct and logical connection with a strict liability
system. This is due to the function of this principle placing the financial burden on relevant
operators, not the state. Therefore, any standard of liability between fault and strict liability
types could be chosen under the “polluter pays” principle.
Additionally, the use of precautionary principle should be well reflected in the
Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol, as well as the Biosafety Protocol liability
system. This principle acknowledges the need for environmental protection measures in case
of a potential serious risk. Under the precautionary principle, the expansion of the application
scope in each issue (a mitigation of litigation requirements) would be persuasive. Therefore,
many international or national agreements based on strict liability could be understood based
on how much more it reflects the precautionary principle in the field of a liability regime.241
For a sound and reasonable GMO liability system in the future, the system should
accommodate the fundamental principles such as the “polluter pays” principle and the
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precautionary principle. It should also consider the nature of GMO characteristics and
uniqueness.

3. Key judicial issues possible for current systems and reasonable future
standards in GMO liability lawsuits

This section will address the main issues on what the definitions of damage, party,
standard of liability, and exemptions are. The solutions for each hypothetical judicial issue
should improve the effectiveness of remedy for injured parties, and at the same time consider
the current scientific uncertainty of GMO risks. Since establishing reasonable standards in
each issue requires striking a balance, it is a difficult but necessary task to set up substantial
international standards in the area of GMO liability.
a. Definition of the damage caused by GMOs

The Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol broadly defines what the damage
is in this protocol. According to the report suggested during the discussions, the damage in
this protocol includes environmental damage (including air, water, and soil pollutions),
biodiversity damage (genetic variability and ecosystem destruction), harms to humans (health
or property damage), and response measures cost.242 Among the harms associated with
GMOs, the environmental harm is especially difficult to address since a causal link is hard to
prove and the scope of damage is hard to define. However, it is important and noteworthy to
discuss these issues and create a potential solution.243
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The GMOs included under the Biosafety Protocol are GMOs intended for direct use
of food, feed, or processing, GMOs for contained use, and GMOs for intentional introduction
into the environment. This definition means that the damage by processed GM products is
excluded from the damage scope. This definition might make the liability and redress system
very ineffective. From the perspective of the precautionary principle, it is reasonable for the
Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol to embrace many kinds of damage. Therefore,
for the efficient damage relief, it is necessary to cover the damage caused by GM products
because the GMO damage could occur mainly by GM products.
Meanwhile, the evaluation of the damage is also important since it determines the
amount of compensation necessary. For this evaluation, the GMO risk assessment should be
utilized. The risk assessment could be helpful in assessing all the possible damages arising
from GMOs by giving more accurate information on GMOs.
b. Parties (Plaintiff and Defendant)

The GMO liability should cover as many involved parties as possible. As explained
in the characteristic of GMO liability lawsuits, many parties could be involved in GMO
lawsuits. The parties, such as a producer, an exporting state, a notifier, a carrier, an importer,
and an importing state, could be liable as an “operator” under the Liability and Redress
Supplementary Protocol.244 There were many controversies between countries on the
defendant issue (the question on who was liable for the damage occurred). There was also a
suggestion that the liability could be channeled to any one person.245 However, each person
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involved participates in the transboundary movement of GMOs with its own obligations.
Therefore, it is reasonable that all those who are attributed to the GMO damage occurrence
should be liable, depending on their fault. Also, the idea that all persons who is liable must
compensate for the damage as operators is very consistent with the “polluter pays”
principle.246 Many of the parties mentioned above, who contribute to the damage occurring
caused by GMOs and control the damage, should be liable and compensate for the damage
under the “polluter pays” principle.
Similar to the defendant issue, there is also a need for the expansion of the scope in
the plaintiff issue. The Basel Liability Protocol does not provide this, but it is interpreted as
any person suffering damage can raise a GMO liability lawsuit.247 Even though the Liability
and Redress Supplementary Protocol does not specify the possible plaintiff, it is possible to
presume that any person who suffers damage could be a plaintiff, including individuals and
entities. Furthermore, especially in the field of environmental damage claims, there is a
question on whether the environmental organization, which is not injured directly, could file a
liability lawsuit.248 The need for the expansion of standing to sue is recognized in the GMO
liability lawsuit that is associated with environmental damage. Embracing as many parties as
a plaintiff, including environmental organizations could be helpful for an efficient and strong
liability system.
c. Standard of liability (fault liability vs. strict liability)

Establishing the standard of liability is the most essential and difficult part in order to
contribute to the decision of a liability lawsuit outcome. As mentioned before, the standard of
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liability also should meet the need for reflecting characteristics of GMOs and the
fundamental liability principle. Furthermore, it should follow the basic principle of a civil
liability system and at the same time, efficiently protect the injured party using the
precautionary principle.
The Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol has adopted a civil liability
system, and the basic principle under a civil liability system is that a plaintiff should prove
the defendant’s fault in order to claim damages. On the contrary to this fault-based liability,
the strict liability has been developed in some multilateral treaties addressing ultra-hazardous
activity, such as nuclear or oil pollution. The strict liability standard applies to abnormally
dangerous activities that create catastrophic damages, even though the possibility of this
happening is low.249 This strict liability system removes obstacles of fault liability system,
such as the burden of proof imposed to a plaintiff, and makes the defendant liable without
fault.250
However, it is presently hard to determine whether a GMO transboundary movement
is an abnormally dangerous activity. As mentioned several times above, the risk of GMOs in
current circumstances is scientifically uncertain. Even though it is true that the evidence and
experiments to prove the potential harms of GMOs have been increasing, it does not
necessarily demand a strict liability system. Additionally, under the international
environmental law, a strict liability system could not be considered as a customary law until
now.251 In order to mitigate the conflict of opinions between the developed countries’ fault
liability assertion and the developing countries’ strict liability assertion, a theory of
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compromise has been suggested called the “mitigated strict liability.”252 Meanwhile, the
Basel Liability Protocol provides a combination of strict and fault liability, which applies a
fault liability standard in case violations occur, and applies a strict liability standard in case of
no violations. However, both of these examples are not reasonable since the first mitigated
strict liability does not set clear criteria for the standard of liability and the Basel Liability
Protocol is excessively favorable for a plaintiff.
Finally, it is reasonable to follow a fault-based standard, which is a fundamental
principle of a civil liability system. As a next step, some ways to lighten a plaintiff’s burden
of proof should be designed for balancing and complementing a plaintiff’s adverse condition
in the area of biotechnology techniques, such as GMOs.
d. Exemptions and Time Limit

In a liability lawsuit, exemptions and time limit are necessary to be dealt with
carefully because they are directly connected with the outcome of the lawsuit. As the
exemptions to release a defendant from the obligation of being liable for the damage, the
Liability Redress Supplementary Protocol provides the Act of God and Act of war defenses.
However, besides these exemptions, a state of the art defense could be discussed as a possible
defense, a protest of inevitability under the modern technology. Even though a party could
provide this state of the art defense by its domestic laws, the Gene Technology Act explicitly
excludes the state of the art defense.253 Like Germany, it is reasonable not to include this
defense in a GMO liability lawsuit due to the possibility of a state of the art defense letting a
defendant escape from the liability in many cases. In order to protect the injured party and
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compensate adequately for the damages caused by GMOs under the precautionary principle,
the exemption needs to be minimized.
The time line issue, which is a period decision for a plaintiff to file a lawsuit against a
defendant, is important because it could affect the possibility of litigation itself. Since it could
take a while to realize the damages caused by GMOs, it is necessary to set longer time limits
in GMO liability lawsuits, considering the uniqueness of GMOs.254 Even though the EU has
set a time limit of thirty years, critics suggest that thirty years may be too short.

4. Summary

Like the GMO labeling system, it is necessary to compromise and balance the GMO
liability system and compensation regime. It is too early to adopt a strict liability system
under the current scientific uncertainty evidence on GMO risks. In a civil liability framework,
the balanced liability system should be the choice of fault-based liability while mitigating a
plaintiff’s burden of proof, making up for the weakness of the plaintiff. This solution will be
consistent with the “polluter pays” principle. Additionally, the specific standards of each
judicial issue are also required to reflect the “polluter pays” principle and precautionary
principle. In resolving the possible legal issues regarding the definition of damage, litigation
parties, and time limits, it is necessary to extend the scope toward a more effective
compensation for the damages caused by GMOs using the precautionary principle. It would
be best not to extend the exemptions in the same context.
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D. Possibility for a new GMO liability legislation based on existing domestic laws

The specific problems discussed in the previous section are controversial since the
existing Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol does not substantially and efficiently
regulate current international liability issues by asking each country to regulate according to
its own law.255 Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the existing domestic liability laws.
Additionally, establishing reasonable and agreeable standards within domestic laws will be
helpful to create international agreements in regards to each issue listed in Section C.
Countries could use these existing laws to deal with international GMO liability or make new
legislations that are specific in its liability and compensation laws only for GMOs. If the
current domestic laws are reasonable and reflect the principles suggested in Section C, there
would be no conflict. However, if they do not reflect the suggested principles, the countries
should consider a revision or new law for GMO liability. Since each country’s circumstance
is different in the US, EU, and South Korea, this section will first review each country’s
existing laws and evaluate them in order to create a comprehensive GMO liability law.
Finally this section will express the need for harmonization in a GMO liability system
between countries in order to overcome the problems that different domestic laws may cause.

1. Current circumstances regarding GMO liability system in the US, EU and
South Korea

There are two options within GMO liability. Some specifically deal with the liability
caused by GMOs and some do not recognize GMOs as being special and different from other
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environmental harms. Within the attitudes of specially dealing with GMO liability, some
countries regulate GMO liability with general liability legislations, such as environmental
liability laws. On the other hand, some countries deal with GMO liability with specific
domestic laws, focusing on the GMO liability and compensation itself. The US, EU, and
South Korea have different circumstances in addressing the GMO liability and compensation.
a. US approach

As seen in the GMO labeling system, the US does not have a comprehensive law for
GMO regulations and also does not have a liability law for the damage caused by GMOs.

256

Even though there is an effort to enact a law dealing with biotechnology in some states, these
laws do not include provisions on the liability issue.257 Therefore, the GMO related lawsuit
in the US relies on existing common law tort remedies, which are negligence, strict liability,
and nuisance.258 However, these tort law remedies are insufficient within each of the
categories.
First, the existence of duty to exercise reasonable care is required for the negligence
claim.259 For example, a farmer has an obligation to comply with governmental authorization
and the farmer who fails to follow the duty could be sued.260 Second, the strict liability
system is also accepted and the Restatement of Torts is to list the factors in order to determine
the abnormally dangerous activities.261 Specifically, biotechnology manufacturers of biotech
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product could be strictly liable under the strict products liability system.262 The strict
products liability system is significant enough to force manufacturers to prevent them from
producing a potentially hazardous organism.263 Third, there are two kinds of nuisance:
private nuisance and public nuisance.264 A farmer who grows traditional or organic crops
could sue against a neighboring farmer who grows GM crops on the basis of private
nuisance.265 The StarLink case266 and Monsanto case267 are the representative public
nuisance cases.268
In the US, the torts law is applied to the GMO liability lawsuits as an existing
common law due to the lack of laws that only address GMO liability issues.269 Therefore the
current GMO liability system might not be strong enough, given that the existing laws do not
sufficiently cover the GMO liability and redress issues.
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b. EU’s approach

The EU has tried to come up with a liability regime that focuses on environmental
liability for a long time, and the Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability was recently
adopted to satisfy this regime.270 The Directive 2004/35 is based on the “polluter pays”
principle, placing the burden on the polluter who causes the damage to compensate for the
damage.271 Under the Directive 2004/35, operators are responsible for the imminent threat of
damage, as well as the damage already occurred. This strongly reflects the precautionary
principle.272 However, this Directive is not complete and does not cover all the damages
caused by GMOs since the Directive deals with only environmental damage and excludes
traditional damage (i.e., loss of life, human body and property damage). Also, the Directive
does not impose the right to claim for compensation on private parties.273 In addition to the
Directive 2004/35, the Directive 85/374, which deals with products liability system in the EU,
could apply to the GMO liability lawsuits. It provides strict liability and has been revised to
include primary agricultural products.274 However, the Directive 85/374 covers only
economic injury or property damage.275 Seen from these Directives, the EU does not have a
Directive for GMO liability and the existing Directives cover only a limited area.
Meanwhile, even though the EU does not have a Directive that specifically deals
with the GMO liability and compensation, Germany has a domestic law to regulate liability
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for the damage caused by genetic engineering. It is called the Gene Technology Act, which
could be applied to the damage caused by GMOs. The Gene Technology Act provides a strict
liability system and excludes the state of the art defense, as mentioned in Section C (d).276
Furthermore, this act considers the fact that having information on GMOs is not equivalent
between a plaintiff and defendant, and provides a provision to cover this problem by
imposing the right to ask information to a plaintiff.277
The EU has a lot of laws relevant to the GMO liability and redress system showing
their effort to set up a reasonable GMO liability system in the EU, including member state’s
improved law (e.g., Gene Technology Act by Germany). However, all the laws are insufficient
due to the limited areas covered in its liability and compensation systems regarding GMO
damage.
c. South Korea’s approach

The LMO Act, enacted in South Korea as an implementation of the Biosafety
Protocol, does not have a provision relevant to liability and compensation. After the adoption
of the Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol, there is currently a discussion in South
Korea. Some say that the existing Civil Act, Product Liability Act, and Framework Act on
Environmental Policy are enough, while some argue that a new legislation for GMO liability
is necessary.
First, the torts law under the Civil Act adopts a fault liability principle, which requires
an injured party to prove the opposite party’s fault and causal link. Therefore torts law is not
276
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enough for the relief of the injured party.278 Specifically, it is very hard for the victims to
prove the fault and causal link because most information regarding the GMOs was given to
large companies and is very limited to the consumer victim.279 Second, the Product Liability
Act provides a strict liability, but there is a limit for the application of the GMO liability case.
Under the Product Liability Act, the primary agricultural products are excluded from the
scope of this law, unlike the revised Directive 85/374 of the EU.280 Even though the GM
crops are included in the scope of this law, the relief of a victim is also difficult since the state
of the art defense is not excluded (unlike the Gene Technology Act of Germany). Finally, the
Framework Act on Environmental Policy provides a strict liability system but it only covers
the environmental damage occurred in a place of business.281 Therefore, it is doubtful that
the existing laws will apply to the GMO liability cases, and it is also difficult to fully cover
the damages.282
Like the US and EU, South Korea has not established a GMO liability system with
special legislation, and only uses the existing domestic laws. These existing laws have a
limitation in how it applies to the GMO liability lawsuits, which leads to a discussion on a
new and specific legislation about GMO liability and redress.
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2. The limits of existing laws and need for a new legislation on GMO liability
system

The US, EU, and South Korea do not have a comprehensive liability system that only
applies to GMO liability and compensation. It is necessary to form a GMO liability and
redress system with a new legislation for all three countries. First, existing domestic laws
have limitations. Since the torts laws are based on just fault liability, without a supplementary
tool to lighten the burden of proof, it is hard for a plaintiff to get relief from the damage
caused by GMOs.283 Additionally, there is a concern that the existing laws, providing a strict
liability, would not apply to the GMO liability lawsuits due to the failure to meet the
requirements. Another reason for needing a new domestic legislation is that without a
comprehensive liability law for GMOs, the uniqueness of GMOs cannot be well reflected in
the liability lawsuits resulting from GMO damages. In other words, the existing laws are not
sufficient to cover the characteristics of GMO damages, the complexity of parties, and the
potential long-term effects of GMOs.284
The existing laws of the US, EU, and South Korea have a problem covering all
aspects of GMOs since each law is too narrow and the GMO characteristics are not fully
defined. Therefore, a new legislation for a GMO liability and redress is needed for an
efficient relief of damages caused by GMOs. The new legislation will also be helpful in
giving an easy and comprehensive understanding on how each country prepares its GMO
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liability system.

3. Global harmonization in making a liability system within each country

Along with needing an independent law for a GMO liability system in each country,
the uniformity of domestic law in the countries is required. Meanwhile, since the Liability
and Redress Supplementary Protocol allows for a party to implement a stricter legislation, it
is possible and encouraging that some states have an advanced type of law, as seen
Germany’s Gene Technology Act. Even though a more advanced and stricter domestic law
like EU is ideal nationally, it is not always reasonable internationally. A much stricter
domestic law would cause a dissonance with other countries on international level, and it
creates a possible international conflicts. Additionally, the difference and big gap might cause
other problems of international jurisdiction and forum shopping.285 A successful GMO
liability regime could be guaranteed if a balance within and between each liability issue exists.
This will lead to greater participation among the countries and in embracing the GMO
exporting countries.286 Therefore, the adoption of fault-based liability is deemed to be
reasonable as a basic principle under a civil liability regime. This new potential regime
should also be accompanied by the mitigation of the burden of proof to create a balance
between the parties in a lawsuit.
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When the countries reach an agreement toward a reasonable liability system, the
unified domestic laws of each country will help resolve the forum shopping problem and also
affect international laws positively by making it easier for a future international agreement in
the area of GMO liability. In addition, it will be also helpful to follow good examples from
other countries by sharing information through the Clearing House (under the Biosafety
Protocol).287 The right to information disclosure claim of the Gene Technology Act in
Germany could also be an example of a recommendable system. By cooperating with each
other for agreeable international and domestic standards, the future international GMO
liability lawsuits could be solved with less conflict.

V.

Conclusion

The varying attitudes on GMOs among the US, EU, and South Korea creates
international trade conflicts. It should be mediated by establishing reasonable labeling and
liability system focused on preventing potential GMO risks. Even though the system, which
emphasizes the precautionary principle, is ideal, the balanced and compromised approach that
accepts the opposite arguments is needed due to totally different attitudes and interests among
the countries. Addressing the GMO issues and finding a reasonable GMO labeling and
liability regulation is very complex and difficult since the conflicts are between developed
and developing countries and also amongst the developed countries (e.g., the US and EU).
However, if a reasonable standard in GMO regulation is established, it would be valuable in
other fields (e.g., science, technology, and bioethics) dealing with other relevant issues
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regarding legal regulations.288
First, the GMO labeling is a very controversial global issue, especially in the
countries involved in GMO exports and imports. The interest conflicts between countries
arguing for a mandatory labeling and voluntary labeling system will likely cause international
trade disputes. In addition, consumers are less informed and confused by GMOs, which leads
to vague fear of GMOs. Therefore, specific and clearly defined rules for GMO labeling
regulations are needed to follow the principle of the consumer’s right to know. The important
thing about consumer’s right to know within the GMO labeling regulation is that the
discussion on whether to label GMOs and how to label GMOs is relevant to the consumers’
right to know and irrelevant to the decision as to whether the GMO are safe or harmful.
This paper is based on the idea that the GMO labeling system needs to be strict and
specific, because having a labeling regulation is the most lenient and fundamental regulation
under the scientific uncertainty principle. The ideal labeling system should be provided for
the purpose of delivering the basic information of GMOs to consumers with the methods of
reducing consumer’s confusion. For these reasons, the mandatory GMO labeling system is
more efficient than the voluntary labeling system in enforcing “consumer’s right to know.”
The EU’s current labeling system that requires the labeling for all the GM foods without
exceptions is the best way to describe the GMO materials in the most precise and accurate
manner, and to best satisfy the consumers’ demand for GMO information. Additionally, the
EU’s mandatory labeling system is consistent with the WTO rules of the SPS and TBT
Agreement. However, completely doing it EU’s say is too strict. Therefore, a new system that
incorporates EU’s current mandatory system and eliminates South Korea’s drawbacks is
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needed. For example, too strong of a threshold in the EU is not recommendable, and the
problematic labeling methods causing confusion, such as “GMO-free” labeling should not be
allowed even though South Korea permits this labeling method.
Consequently, having an efficient labeling system will be great in that it will ensure
the fundamental regulation under the scientific uncertainty by giving accurate facts and
information on GMOs, satisfying consumer’s demand. Additionally, it will help solve the
other issue of GMO liability by making it easy to find the source of damage when the liability
disputes arise.
Next, the GMO liability system also needs clearly defined standards since current
Liability and Redress Supplementary Protocol under the Biosafety Protocol is not efficient.
With the mandatory labeling system, an efficient GMO liability system will reduce concerns
about GMO risks and GMO damages. Additionally, in the circumstances of inevitable growth
and trade of GMOs, the negotiated international standard under the GMO liability will give
benefits to both parties of exporting and importing countries by facilitating GMO trades
based on the predictable agreement for the exporting party and guaranteeing sufficient
damage relief for the importing party.
The GMO liability system and derived specific standards should protect the party
injured by GMOs in the direction of compensating the damage fully and efficiently using the
precautionary principle. Mitigating the burden of proof is also important when considering
the imbalance between a plaintiff damaged by GMOs and a defendant having a lot of
information on GMO technology. At the same time, the GMO liability system should not
infringe the basic rules of a liability lawsuit. Synthesizing these directions for the GMO
liability system on an international level, the most reasonable option for the international
GMO liability and redress system is to adopt a civil liability system supported by state
96

liability and international funds. The standard of liability should be a fault-based liability
under the civil liability system, not a strict liability, since the strict liability standard is a little
hard to be accepted in current circumstances. Meanwhile, domestically, even though there are
many laws in the US, EU, and South Korea, it is not enough to cover all the possible damages
caused by GMOs to the human and the environment. Therefore, newly enacted laws for the
GMO liability and redress regime are required in all three countries of the US, the EU, and
South Korea because of the loopholes in the international laws and the insufficiency of the
domestic laws. The new and comprehensive law regarding GMO damage, liability and
compensation should embrace the uniqueness of GMOs.
In conclusion, having an efficient liability system and setting up agreeable standards
will ensure solving future international lawsuits without difficulty. If each country tries to
make a new liability system domestically toward the ideal international standards, the GMO
liability system could be strengthened and avoid the forum shopping problem.
The US, EU, and South Korea should make an effort for the proposed labeling and
liability system, recognizing different situations to face with. As a leader of biotechnology,
including GMOs, the US’s consideration of joining the CBD and Biosafety Protocol will be
the first step for the effective GMO regulation.289 The EU has shown that the strictness in
both GMO labeling system and liability system and the EU’s Directives and Regulations
regarding GMOs give a lesson as how the precautionary perspective works in regards to the
GMO risks. However, it is necessary for the EU to keep pace with other countries by
continuously sharing information and being compromising with other countries. Finally,
South Korea has to try to make a balanced argument in international negotiations on GMO
289
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regulations. The current GMO labeling regulation that accepts too many labeling exceptions
needs to be revised in order to improve the effectiveness of the GMO labeling system.
Additionally, simplifying the current administrative agencies will be helpful for the
improving the regulation process. In regards to a GMO liability system, the new and
comprehensive liability enactment for the GMOs is recommendable, rather than just
including some provisions to the current LMO Act.
In order to continue the growth of GMOs and enjoy the benefits from the GMOs, it
should go hand in hand with a legal infrastructure. To enhance the effectiveness of the legal
system, the effort to make this legal system practical for countries is necessary. Furthermore,
if the international cooperation and monitoring systems are added, it will help advance the
GMO regulations.290 In this sense, it is reasonable for South Korea’s LMO Act to add a new
provision in 2012 that requires a concerned minister of an administrative agency to examine,
monitor, and publicize the GMO environmental effects.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a legal analysis of the GMO labeling and
liability system, and it does not utilize the scientific, economic and social approach. However,
a manifold approach and finding connections between these other fields of research are
necessary to solve GMO issues. The socioeconomic analysis would be a valuable alternative
approach. The discussion on how to deal with the socioeconomics damage and including it
into the compensation for the damages should especially be taken into consideration.
Additionally, the possibility of GMOs as an alternative of bioenergy and derived legal matters
from this could be an area for future research.
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